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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DESIGN PATENTS 
 
RALPH D. CLIFFORD* & RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE** 
 
ABSTRACT 
Design patents have been part of American law since 1842. In that time, 
only just over 600,000 design patents have been issued, with more than half 
of these being granted in the last twenty years. This quantity is dramatically 
fewer than the number of utility patents issued which is rapidly approaching 
9,000,000 issued patents. Possibly because of the low usage of design 
patents over time, no case law and little literature address the constitutional 
issues raised by them. This article intends to overcome that shortcoming. 
Two constitutional aspects of design patents will be examined.  
First, congressional authority to adopt the design patent laws will be 
examined. The Constitution in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 grants Congress 
specific powers to adopt both patents and copyrights. When a design is 
examined, it is unclear that it is an invention making its patentability suspect. 
At the same time, establishing a design as a writing is not problematic, 
leading to its eligibility for copyright. In this case, the clause itself must be 
examined to determine if something that qualifies only for copyright 
protection can nevertheless be granted a patent. The words chosen in the 
clause, particularly based on the way some of them were used in the 
Eighteenth Century, suggest that the answer is “no.” Of course, any 
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historical analysis of the Constitution may prove to be an inaccurate 
predictor of how modern courts would address an issue, but this analysis 
does suggest a significant Article I problem for design patents.  
Second, even if the Article I problem can be overcome, serious First 
Amendment issues are raised. Unlike a utility patent, design patents are far 
more likely to have direct impacts on speech. If so, the patent laws would 
have to accommodate that speech unless there is a compelling governmental 
need for it to not do so. Copyright law, for example, avoids much of this First 
Amendment conflict through the recognition of the Fair Use Defense under 
17 U.S.C. § 107 which allow society to use copyrighted materials despite the 
legal protection where important First Amendment issues are raised. Patent 
law has no such defense, but may need one to avoid constitutional problems. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When most people think of patents, they probably will be considering 
utility patents. These are by far the most numerous kind of patent in the U.S.1 
and are the kind of legal protection obtained by the famous inventors such as 
Thomas Edison.2 Utility patents establish rights to an invention3 that is new,4 
useful,5 and not just an obvious extension of what has already been invented.6 
 
 1.  See Table of Annual U.S. Patent Activity Since 1790, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar. 
26, 2014, 12:17:45 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm (showing that 
8,601,356 utility and 696,093 design patents have been issued by the U.S., over a twelve to one ratio). 
 2.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 307,031 (filed Oct. 21, 1884) (claiming the electrical filament light 
bulb). 
 3.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Inventions can be machines, manufacturers, compositions of matter, 
or methods”). See, e.g. Diamond v. Charkrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980) (holding patent on 
bacterium that consumes oil eligible); id. at 309 (“The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas have been held not patentable.”).  The dividing line between these unpatentable abstract ideas and 
a patentable invention is enigmatic, at best. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 
2354 (2014) (“[W]e must distinguish between patents that claim the building blocks of human ingenuity 
and those that integrate the building blocks into something more, thereby transforming them into a patent-
eligible invention.” (quotation and citation omitted)); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229–31 (2010) 
(holding patent that claims a method of hedging risks in commodity trading ineligible). 
 4.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (2012). If an invention that is claimed for patent has already been 
made, it is described as being “anticipated.” See Structural Rubber Products Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 
F.2d 707, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Anticipation requires that each element in the patent claim is found in the 
prior art. See id. at 715–16. 
 5.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1966) (rejecting a 
patent on a newly created chemical because no use for the chemical was disclosed). 
 6.  See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
Nonobviousness operates on top of anticipation. If a claimed invention has been already fully described, 
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Utility patents, however, have a lesser known sibling—the design patent. 
Design patents are available for the ornamental aspects of an article of 
manufacture.7 As with utility patents, these ornamental features must be new 
and non-obvious,8 though they cannot be useful.9 
Congress’s authority to allow patents to be granted is contained in 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution. Today, this clause is 
commonly called the Intellectual Property Clause.10 This short-hand phrase 
leads to a problem in analysis, however. Although we now consider 
intellectual property to be a unified field of law, this was not true when the 
Constitution was drafted and does not reflect the language used in the clause. 
Consequently, while the authority for Congress to adopt utility patents is 
clear, design patents are problematic as they do not meet squarely the 
requisites of the Clause. 
Furthermore, granting a monopoly to make, use, or sell a patented 
design limits others from incorporating the design into their own creations. 
Because of the ornamental nature of a design patent, this rescission from the 
marketplace raises free speech issues that utility patents do not. It would be 
possible, for example, to exploit a design patent to suppress political 
expression, social commentary, or creative art. Others would be prohibited 
 
it is anticipated. See authorities cited supra note 4. If it has not been fully described, but is a clear 
extension of what is already known, § 103 bars the patent. See John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
 7.  See 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012) (“Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for 
an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”). For an excellent description of the basics of design patent law, see Sarah Burstein, Design Patent 
Myths—An Introduction, THE FACULTY LOUNGE BLOG, (Oct. 2, 2013, 4:10 PM), 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/10/design-patent-mythsan-introduction.html; Sarah Burstein, 
Design Patent Myths—It’s Really Difficult to Get a Design Patent, THE FACULTY LOUNGE BLOG, (Oct. 
4, 2013, 9:25 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/10/really-difficult-to-get-a-design-
patent.html; Sarah Burstein, Design Patent Myths—Most Designs Can’t Satisfy the Requirement of 
“Nonobviousness”, THE FACULTY LOUNGE BLOG, (Oct. 14, 2013, 9:09 PM), 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/10/nonobviousness.html; Sarah Burstein, Design Patent Myths—
Only Artistic Designs Can Be Patented, THE FACULTY LOUNGE BLOG, (Oct. 16, 2013, 9:24 AM), 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/10/design-patent-mythsonly-artistic-designs-can-be-
patented.html; Sarah Burstein, Design Patent Myths—You Can Only Get Design Patents for Applied 
Ornaments, THE FACULTY LOUNGE BLOG, (Oct. 21, 2013, 8:12 AM), 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/10/ornaments.html. 
 8.  See 35 U.S.C. § 171(b) (2012) (“The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions 
shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.”); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe 
Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 9.  See L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123. 
 10.  See, e.g., Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091, 3112–13 
(2014); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 75 (2014); Miriam Bitton, Patenting 
Abstractions, 15 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 153, 209 (2014); Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, 
and Cogitation: A Search for the Minimal Creativity Standard in Copyright Law, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 
259, 266 (2004). 
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from making or using the representations protected by the design patent,11 
even when the public interest in promoting the free flow of information and 
ideas outweighs the interest in granting the time-limited patent monopoly. 
The law of design patents, as presently understood, incorporates none of the 
accommodations of expression known in other areas of IP law, particularly 
the copyright fair use doctrine. In other words, design patents can directly 
and adversely impact speech that is at the core of First Amendment 
protection. 
This article will discuss both of these issues. In section two, the Article 
I power of Congress to adopt design patents will be examined. The result of 
this analysis will be to call into question the appropriateness of the 
enactment. The third section of the paper will consider the omission of First 
Amendment accommodation in design patent law and show that the Patent 
Act must have some exception to protect freedom of speech. The analysis 
will describe a doctrine of design patent fair use, modeled on the copyright 
fair use provision.12 As happened in copyright law,13 the design patent fair 
use concept is susceptible of judicial construction. 
II.  AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO GRANT DESIGN 
PATENTS 
Design patents are not new creations.14 The first version of them was 
authorized by the Patent Act of 1842.15 The design patent provisions were 
 
 11.  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent shall . . . Grant to the patentee . . . The right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States”). 
 12.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1401 (2014) (making a parallel argument for establishing a fair use defense in trade secret law). 
 13.  See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) 
(noting that 17 U.S.C. § 107 “codif[ied] the common-law doctrine”). 
 14.  For a comprehensive history of the design patent laws, see Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, 
The Origins of American Design Patent Protection, 88 IND. L.J. 837 (2013). 
 15.  Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44: 
[A]ny citizen . . . who by his . . . own industry, genius, efforts, and expense, may have invented 
or produced any new and original design for a manufacture, whether of metal or other material 
or materials, or any new and original design for the printing of woollen, silk, cotton, or other 
fabrics, or any new and original design for a bust, statue, or bas relief or composition in alto or 
basso relievo, or any new and original impression or ornament, or to be placed on any article 
of manufacture, the same being formed in marble or other material, or any new and useful 
pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or painted or cast 
or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture, or any new and original shape or 
configuration of any article of manufacture not known or used by others before his . . . 
invention . . . may make application . . . to the Commissioner of Patents . . . and the 
Commissioner . . . may grant a patent therefor. 
 The fact that design patents were adopted early in the history of the U.S. does little to establish their 
constitutionality under Article I. Early Congresses could be just a prone to adopt constitutionally suspect 
provisions as current ones are. The law of seditious libel is a good example. See Sedition Act, July 14, 
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amended multiple times before 195216 when Congress adopted the current 
patent code that covers both utility and design patents.17 
Examining the history and structure of the Intellectual Property Clause18 
shows constitutional weaknesses underlying the adoption of design patents. 
In fact, Congress’s power to act as it has is hard to justify. 
A.  The “Intellectual Property” Clause Has Two Dichotomous 
Powers—One for Patents and One for Copyrights 
The congressional power to grant patents is contained in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution. The clause reads, “The Congress 
shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”19 Under modern parlance, 
this clause is usually referred to as the Intellectual Property Clause.20 This 
treatment of the clause as a single, unified grant of power is inappropriate, 
however. 
Although the copyright and patent powers are combined into a single 
clause, they are nevertheless distinct and dichotomous. The proper treatment 
 
1798, ch. 74, § 1, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired in 1801) (prohibiting “oppos[ing] any measure or measures 
of the government of the United States . . . “); id. § 2 (prohibiting “any person [from] writ[ing], print[ing], 
utter[ing] or publish[ing] . . . [anything about] Congress, or the . . . President, [which] . . . bring[s] them, 
or either of them, into contempt or disrepute”). This law was also adopted early in the history of the 
United States by many of the same people who had drafted the Bill of Rights despite its almost certain 
violation of the First Amendment. Indeed, this law was enforced without concern about the constitutional 
problem. See JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 211–20 (1951) 
(describing the conviction of James Callender for violating the Sedition Acts for writing that the John 
Adams administration was a “continual tempest of malignant passions.”). 
 The unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act has been long acknowledged. See N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (noting that Congress acknowledged the unconstitutionality of the 
Act in 1840 and refunded all penalties that had been assessed under the law). See generally, Lawrence 
Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free 
Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 19–22 (2011) (discussing the interrelationship between the Sedition Act and the 
meaning of the First Amendment); Tom W. Bell, Treason, Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 999, 1008 n.36, 1027–40 (2005) (discussing First Amendment implications of the Sedition 
Act as well as treason laws). 
 16.  See Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 11, 12 Stat. 246, 248 (extending term of design patents); 
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 198, 209–10 (expanding items subject to design patent); Act 
of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 105, 24 Stat. 387, 387 (modifying design patent rights); Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, 
32 Stat. 193, 193 (redefining design patents). 
 17.  Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (revising the patent laws and codifying it at 
Title 35 of the U.S. Code). The current design patent provision reads: “Whoever invents any new, original 
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012). 
 18.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See, e.g., supra authorities cited in note 10. 
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of the clause establishes a copyright power, “To promote the Progress of 
Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right 
to their . . . Writings,”21 and a patent power, “To promote the Progress 
of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”22 To understand why this has to be, 
the text of the constitution must be examined, the intent of the drafters must 
be divined, and the historic treatment of the clause must be traced. 
1.  Textual Reasons Why the IP Powers Are Dichotomous 
According to the constitutional clause, the writings of authors and 
discoveries of inventors are held by each “respectively.”23 The word 
“respectively” means “in precisely the order given; sequentially.”24 It means 
that the items in the list are “referr[ed] or appl[ied] to in a parallel or 
sequential way.”25 “The implication of the word [respective] in this respect 
is disjunctive, and separates each group . . . from the other groups.”26 
As discussed in an earlier examination of the clause, grammatically, it 
represents a “balanced sentence.”27 The purpose of a balanced sentence is to 
tie together each individual phrase and set it in distinction to the other phrase 
or phrases.28 In Clause 8, the “science” of “authors” in their “writings” is 
balanced with the “useful art[]” developed by “inventors” in their 
“discoveries.”29 
Clause 8 only has two groups: authors and inventors.30 To treat their 
rights “respectively” and to maintain the balance implemented in the Clause 
requires the writings and inventions to be treated as separate things. In other 
words, the clause says that authors have writings to advance science and 
 
 21.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICT. 1640 (2d ed. 1993). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Sandford v. Stagg, 150 A. 187, 188 (N.J. Ch. 1930). See Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 n.11 
(1949) (listing four statutes with their respective new definitions). 
 27.  Karl B. Lutz, A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 50, 51 (1949–50). 
 28.  See ALBERT LEROY BARTLETT & HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH 
GRAMMAR 281 (1906) (describing the creation and use of balanced sentences). 
 29.  See Lutz, supra note 27; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (acknowledging 
the clause is balanced). 
It should be noted that “science” as used in the Constitution does not have the modern meaning of the 
word. At the time the Constitution was written, “science” meant “learning in general,” Lutz at 51–52; 
rather than a systematic body of knowledge that was derived using confirmable experiments. Similarly, 
“useful arts” was a term that meant “technology” in the 1700s. Id. at 54. 
 30.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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inventors have discoveries to advance the useful arts, but does not recognize 
the converse. Inventors do not have writings and authors do not have 
discoveries. 
2.  The Drafters’ Intent Matches the Text 
Very little direct “legislative” history exists for Clause 8.31 What does 
exist treats copyrights and patents as distinct: “The copyright of authors has 
been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The 
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the 
inventors.”32 In Madison’s view, as the constitutional text states, copyrights 
go to authors and patents go to inventors. 
Another method of divining the drafters’ original intent is to examine 
how the first Congress dealt with the power in question.33 Here, the evidence 
is not conclusive although it suggests that Congress ultimately determined 
that the two powers were distinct. Initially, Congress considered a bill on its 
 
 31.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3242 (2013) (Stevens, concurring); Ralph D. Clifford, 
Simultaneous Copyright and Trade Secret Claims: Can the Copyright Misuse Defense Prevent 
Constitutional Doublethink?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 247, 271 (2000); Thomas B. Nachbar, Patent and 
Copyright Clause, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION (2012), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/1/essays/46/patent-and-copyright-clause (“There is little 
direct evidence about the Patent and Copyright Clause’s original meaning.”). 
 A recent article by Professor Sean M. O’Connor looks at the history of the clause and suggests that 
the clause drafters were more likely to have been expressing a method of advancing progress that was 
consistent with French thought rather than English. See Sean M. O’Connor, The Overlooked French 
Influence on the Intellectual Property Clause, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409796. This analysis makes the proposition that 
the two powers are distinct as a matter of legislative history more compelling as the French distinctions 
between the useful arts and the sciences were even stronger than the modern one. See id. at 4. 
 32.  THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_43.html. Although Madison’s belief that copyrights were part of 
the common law of England was almost certainly wrong, see Nachbar, supra note 31, he was correct in 
describing them as separate from patents. 
 33.  See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983) (noting that the drafters of the First 
Amendment approved of paid chaplains as an argument that such arrangements are constitutional). Of 
course, this method of constitutional analysis is highly suspect. See David Felsen, Comment, 
Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. 
L. REV. 395, 415–19 (1989). Members of the first Congress were just as subject to the politics of the 
times as current politicians are. It is not uncommon for legislatures to adopt provisions that are patently 
unconstitutional as a political move. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (2013) (holding that “[i]t is. . .a basic First Amendment principle that freedom 
of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say,” so law requiring organization 
to oppose prostitution is unconstitutional). See also supra discussion and authorities cited in note 15. Who 
is to say that the members of the first Congress were more concerned with the recently adopted 
constitution than with the next election? See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 125–39 (2001) 
(describing the political considerations that affected each representative’s consideration of the 
Declaration of Independence). 
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first reading that apparently treated copyrights and patents together.34 This 
bill was not further considered in the session, so it died on adjournment.35 In 
the next session, when Congress returned to the consideration of copyrights 
and patents, Congress split its treatment of them into separate matters.36 The 
patent provision was enacted first in April of 1790 with a copyright act 
following approximately one month later.37 Thereafter, copyrights and 
patents were always dealt with as distinct subject matters.38 
Consequently, by 1790, both the limited pre-adoption history behind 
Clause 8 and its treatment in the first Congress result in a recognition that it 
is comprised of two separate powers. This dichotomy is clear as the two 
powers were used and discussed through the first 150 years of the country’s 
existence. 
3.  The Powers Have Been Treated as a Dichotomy Historically 
The split established by the language of the Constitution was routinely 
acknowledged until very recently. Copyrights and patents were considered 
highly distinct areas of the law from the time the Constitution was adopted 
through the 1940s or 50s. Evidence of this can be found in several places. 
First, the academic literature recognized the split. Second, published 
casebooks indicate that the areas were taught as separate subjects. Finally, 
the courts recognized the dichotomy in the few cases where this was relevant. 
Each will be considered in turn. 
a.  Law Reviews 
Based on searches of the Westlaw database of all law journals and 
reviews,39 the first reference in the literature to “intellectual property” as 
referring to both copyrights and patents occurred in a book review that was 
published in 1945.40 Interestingly, the author of the review was critical of the 
 
 34.  See Lutz, supra note 27, at 52 (noting that a bill passed on its first reading but that the contents, 
beyond the title which included all of the Clause 8 text, are unknown). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 52–53. See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); Copyright Act of 1790, Ch. 15, 
1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
 38.  See id. at 53. 
 39.  See JOURNALS & LAW REVIEWS (JLR), http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 40.  Stephen P. Ladas, Harold G. Fox, The Canadian Law of Copyright, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1268 
(1945) (reviewing a book). There was an earlier book that used the term “intellectual property” that was 
published in 1855. LYSANDER SPOONER, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; OR AN ESSAY ON THE 
RIGHT OF AUTHORS AND INVENTORS TO A PERPETUAL PROPERTY IN THEIR IDEAS (1855), available at 
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2243/Spooner_1518_Bk.pdf.  Although the title makes it appear as 
if both copyrights and patents are covered, the book itself addresses rights in ideas without concern of the 
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book’s author for considering copyright law “as a branch of the law of 
industrial property.”41 In distinction, the book review author asserted that 
“[c]opyright is rather related to industrial property both being branches of 
what we may call ‘Intellectual Property.’”42 Before this use, “intellectual 
property” was used within the literature to reference copyright law 
exclusively.43 
The next use of “intellectual property” in the literature to cover more 
than just copyright occurred six years later, again in a book review.44 It was 
not until the 1960s that the term “intellectual property” began to be routinely 
broadened to apply to both patents and copyrights;45 indeed, trademarks46 
and trade secrets47 also began to be incorporated. Of course, by the first 
decade of this century, Westlaw report over 10,000 articles that use the term 
as a collective for all types of protection.48 
b.  Casebooks 
The split seen in the academic literature is also seen in the casebooks 
that were published to teach patents and copyrights in law schools. The first 
casebook that treated intellectual property as a unified subject matter area 
was E. Ernest Goldstein, Cases and Materials on Patent, Trademark and 
Copyright Law, published in 1957.49 Before 1957, there were copyright 
 
specific system that created them. See id. Also, the book argues that a perpetual right to each person’s 
ideas should be recognized which moves the essay far away from the American constitutional scheme of 
copyright and patent protection. 
 41.  Ladas, supra note 40 at 1268. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 202–
03 (1890); Francis J. Swayze, The Growing Law, 25 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1915); Peter J. Hamilton, The 
Spanish Civil Code, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1089,1094 (1918); Note, Revision of the Copyright Law, 51 HARV. 
L. REV. 906, 921 (1938); Note, Rights of Performers and Recorders Against Unlicensed Record 
Broadcasts, 49 YALE L.J. 559, 559 (1940). Cf. Roscoe Pound, Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 
933, 958–59 (1924). 
 44.  John F. Oberlin, Le Droit D’auteur. by Henri Desbois, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1042, 1044 (1951) 
(reviewing a book). 
 45.  See, e.g., Steven Duke, Foreign Authors, Inventors, and the Income Tax, 72 YALE L.J. 1093, 
1094 n.5 (1963). 
 46.  See Jack C. Davis, Navy Patent Matters, 18 JAG J. 214, 231 (1964) (stating that “[p]atents 
together with trademarks and copyrights are generally included within the generic term ‘Intellectual 
Property.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 47.  David Bender, Computer Programs: Should They be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 241, 
248–50 (1968). 
 48.  See JOURNALS & LAW REVIEWS (JLR), http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 49.  DOUGLAS W. LIND, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL CASEBOOKS, 1870–2004 440 
(William S. Hein and Co. 2006). 
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casebooks and there were patent casebooks, but there were no casebooks that 
unified the topics.50 
It took even longer for the term “intellectual property” to make its way 
to the title of a casebook. The first such book was Alpert P. Blaustein & 
Robert A. Gorman, Intellectual Property; Cases and Materials 1960–1970, 
published in 1971.51 Since the 1970s, of course, the term has proliferated.52 
c.  Use in Court 
The transition of the term intellectual property into one that covers all 
of the different species of protection can also be seen in how the term has 
been used in the courthouse. Before the 1970s, the use of the term was very 
rare. Fewer than one percent of the cases involving patents or copyrights 
used the term intellectual property.53 Even through the 1980s, fewer than ten 
percent of the cases used the term.54 More recently, the percentage continues 
to grow and is approaching fifty percent.55 
At least one opinion expressly recognized the dichotomatic nature of 
Clause 8. In Application of Yardley,56 the court acknowledged the 
dichotomy: “the framers of the Constitution recognized a distinction between 
‘authors’ and ‘inventors’ and ‘writings’ and ‘discoveries.’”57 The court then 
determined that the constitution does not prevent an “author-inventor” from 
seeking protection—even simultaneously—under both the patent and 
copyright laws.58 
It is important to note what the Yardley case does not establish. 
Simultaneous copyright and patent protection is a common occurrence, 
particularly within the computer software industry, where each system is 
used to protect a different aspect of the same product.59 The concept that 
multiple intellectual property schemes may apply to the legal protection of a 
 
 50.  See id. at 439–51. 
 51.  See id. at 441. 
 52.  See id. at 439–51. 
 53.  See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1033–34 (2005). 
 54.  See id. 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
 57.  Id. at 1395. 
 58.  Id. at 1395-96. 
 59.  See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECH. § 1:4 (WestLaw last updated Apr., 
2014) (“Today, no serious debate exists about the copyrightability of computer programs; virtually all 
computer programs are copyrighted unless the program is extremely narrow or inextricably connected to 
the process or function it serves.”); id. § 2:21 (“[S]oftware-based invention . . . [is] patentable subject 
matter.”). 
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product is, today, unremarkable.60 What Yardley does not establish, however, 
is that Congress is free to ignore the meaning of Clause 8. Where Congress 
enacts a provision outside of the copyright or patent powers, the provision is 
unconstitutional.61 
4.  Conclusion 
To reach a supportable conclusion about the meaning of Clause 8, it 
must be considered under a two-part analysis. It is not appropriate to 
determine that something is intellectual property and apply the clause as a 
unified qualifier; instead, the Clause requires that it be determined whether 
the power being exercised by Congress is the copyright power or the patent 
power. Only enactments that satisfy the relevant power—copyright or 
patent—should be found to be constitutional under Clause 8. 
When examined this way, design patents are problematic as they are 
neither fish (copyrights) nor fowl (patents). A preliminary demonstration of 
this can be obtained by examining the basic standards used to determine if 
design patent infringement has occurred. The basic test for this was 
articulated by the Supreme Court in 1871 in Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White.62 
The Court held: 
that if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a 
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the 
resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to 
purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed 
by the other.63 
This test incorporates aspects of copyright law as an observer needs to 
find that the infringing product is “substantially the same” as the claimed 
design. This closely mirrors the substantially similar presumption that is used 
in most copyright cases where direct evidence of copying is unavailable.64 
At the same time, the test references the standards used in a trademark 
infringement case. The examination of whether the alleged infringing 
product’s “resemblance [to the patented design] is such as to deceive . . . an 
observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other,” matches 
 
 60.   See, e.g., discussion of the Georgia-Pacific case, infra pp. 55–59. 
 61.  See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 90 (1879) (holding that the federal trademark laws 
could not be adopted under the power given in art. I, § 8, cl. 8 as they are neither the discovery of an 
inventor nor the writings of an author). 
 62.  Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871). 
 63.  Id. at 528. 
 64.  See, e.g., Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315, 1316 (2d Cir. 
1969) (stating “[t]he ultimate test in a copyright infringement case of this sort is whether an average lay 
observer would find a substantial similarity in the designs, recognizing the copy as an appropriation of 
the copyrighted work.”). 
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the basic rule for trademark infringement.65 Importantly, the standard 
“reading on” analysis that is used to determine patent law infringement is 
missing from the Supreme Court’s standard.66 This preliminary analysis 
suggests that design patents may not fit within either branch of Clause 8. 
Consequently, the next section of the paper will engage in a more 
comprehensive analysis of whether design patents are authorized by Clause 
8. 
B.  The Consequences of the Dichotomy—Are Industrial Designs Within 
the Patent Power? 
To be properly enacted, design patents must have been adopted 
pursuant to the patent power contained within Article I of the Constitution.67 
When the Clause is examined, however, the appropriateness of the design 
patent provisions is doubtful. To start the analysis, the limited amount of case 
law that has considered the constitutionality of design patents will first be 
examined. Then, because the case law is not definitive, the text of the patent 
power will be dissected. This will show that design patents have a shaky 
constitutional foundation. 
1.  Limited Case Law 
The Supreme Court has not determined the constitutionality of the 
design patent laws although the Court has acknowledged their existence 
numerous times.68 In none of these cases, however, was the issue of Article 
 
 65.   See, e.g., Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating 
“[i]t is well settled that the crucial issue in an action for trademark infringement. . .is whether there is any 
likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed 
simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.”). 
 66.  See Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 901, 904 (2014). “Reading on” compares an alleged infringing device with 
each limitation in a patent claim and, if there is a fit, infringement is found. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. 
v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). Of course, this “reading on” process is rarely as 
simple as it sounds. See e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 726 
(2002) (applying the doctrines of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel). 
 67.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See supra part II. A. 
 68.  See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 133 n.5 (2001) (dicta); 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000) (indicating that a party could obtain 
a design patent); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (holding that 
state law may not protect “unprotected design and utilitarian ideas embodied in unpatented boat hulls”) 
(emphasis added); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (stating “[b]ut if 
the design is not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can be copied at 
will.”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (stating “[a]n unpatentable article, 
like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be made and sold by 
whoever chooses to do so.”); Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co, 148 U.S. 674, 680-82 (1893) (rejecting design 
patent as lacking innovation); New York Belting & Packing Co. v. New Jersey Car-Spring & Rubber Co., 
137 U.S. 445, 449 (1890) (holding that design patent failed for a lack of novelty); Dobson v. Dornan, 118 
U.S. 10, 17-18 (1886) (awarding nominal damages for design patent infringement); Dobson v. Hartford 
Carpet Co; Dobson v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439, 445-46 (1885) (reversing damage award for 
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I constitutionality raised.69 Without the issue of constitutionality directly 
raised, the Court will not consider any potential constitutional infirmity.70 
We are left, therefore, without Supreme Court guidance. 
There is slightly more case law in the lower courts. Not surprisingly, 
the more significant of these cases were decided by the Federal Circuit’s 
predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals [“C.C.P.A.”]. 
In 1974, the C.C.P.A. decided the Application of Yardley case which 
addressed whether the same design could constitutionality be protected by 
both a copyright and a design patent.71 Yardley had obtained a copyright on 
a watch face and had then applied for a design patent on it.72 The patent office 
rejected the patent as it then required a party who had an object that could be 
both copyrighted and patented to elect which system was going to be used.73 
The C.C.P.A. disagreed with this holding that “[t]he Congress, through its 
legislation under the authority of the Constitution, has interpreted the 
Constitution as authorizing an area of overlap where a certain type of 
creation may be the subject matter of a copyright and the subject matter of a 
design patent.”74 
Mazer v. Stein75 was the primary authority on which the Yardley court 
relied.76 Unfortunately, although the C.C.P.A. treated the language from 
Mazer as holding, it was only dicta as the Supreme Court expressly refused 
to rule on the constitutional issues raised.77 Indeed, the Court eschewed any 
consequence on the patent laws, stating, “As we have held the statuettes here 
involved copyrightable, we need not decide the question of their 
patentability. Though other courts have passed upon the issue as to whether 
allowance by the election of the author or patentee of one bars a grant of the 
other, we do not.”78 Thus, Yardley’s reliance on Mazer as establishing the 
constitutionality of design patents was incorrect. Without other 
 
design patent infringement and remanding for the entry of a nominal judgment); Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 
105 U.S. 94, 97 (1881) (finding design patent valid); Gorham Mfg. Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 
(1871) (establishing the test for design patent infringement). 
 69.   See cases cited in note 68, supra. 
 70.  See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208 (1954) (refusing to reach constitutional question about 
the constitutionality of applying copyright law to industrial designs as the issue was not raised by the 
parties in the courts below). 
 71.  Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
 72.  See id. at 1390–91. 
 73.  See id. at 1393. 
 74.  Id. at 1396. 
 75.  Mazer, 347 U.S. at 206. 
 76.  See Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d at 1394-95. 
 77.  See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 206 n.5. 
 78.  Id. at 217. 
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substantiation, the assumption in Yardley that design patents can apply to 
either inventions or writings—the two objects within the Clause 8 
dichotomy—is highly questionable. 
The C.C.P.A. upheld design patents as constitutional in several earlier 
cases.79 Each time, however, the lack of a legal argument justifying the 
decision is apparent. In Dieterich v. Leaf, the court stated that “[the design 
patent provision] is, of course, based upon the same constitutional provision 
as [the utility patent provisions],”80 but there is not justification for so 
holding. Similarly, in In re Schnell, the C.C.P.A. stated that “Congress in 
1842, under the authority granted by article 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, 
enacted the first design patent law (Statute II, August 29, 1842, c. 263, 5 Stat. 
543), . . .”81 but again failed to substantiate the statement with an examination 
of whether the enactment was a valid exercise of the power. 
There does not appear to be any case in the Courts of Appeal where the 
constitutionality of the design patent laws was expressly considered. As with 
the C.C.P.A., the cases that exist assume that the design patent laws are 
constitutional without actually litigating the issue.82 
There are obviously numerous district court cases that rule on the 
enforceability of design patents without any concern about the constitutional 
validity of the provision. A search of the U.S. District Court Cases Database 
on WestLaw for “design patent,” for example, returns 1,403 cases.83 If the 
search is further limited by requiring “constitutional” to be in the same 
paragraph as “design patent,” the return drops to fifteen cases.84 Most of 
these cases involve potential constitutional problems other than the 
interpretation of Clause 8 such as standing,85 personal jurisdiction,86 and 
preemption.87 With these alternate ground cases removed, only three have 
considered any potential Article I problem. 
 
 79.  Dieterich v. Leaf, 89 F.2d 226, 229 (C.C.P.A. 1937); In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 205 (C.C.P.A. 
1931). 
 80.  Dieterich, 89 F.2d at 229. 
 81.  In re Schnell, 46 F.2d at 205. 
 82.  See, e.g. Goudy v. Hansen, 247 F. 782, 789 (1st Cir. 1917) (finding a design patent invalid for 
lack of novelty); Mygatt v. Schaffer, 218 F. 827, 838 (2d Cir. 1914) (finding a design patent valid); 
Charles Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros. Co., 199 F. 139, 144 (7th Cir. 1912) (finding a design patent invalid 
for lack of novelty). 
 83.  See U.S. DISTRICT COURT CASES (DCT), http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 84.  See id. 
 85.  See e.g., Vita-Herb Nutriceuticals, Inc. v. Probiohealth, LLC, No. SACV 11-1463 DOC, 2013 
WL 1182992, at *3–5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2013). 
 86.  See e.g., Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Dawson Int’l Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (N.D. Ind. 
2002). 
 87.  See e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 112, 118 (D. Mass.) aff’d in part, 
163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998). 
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The most directly relevant of these is Hadco Products, Inc. v. Lighting 
Corp. of America, Inc.88 In the case, the court asks, “The requirement of 
advancement, present in the constitutional standard of patentability, seems 
to have far less practical application in design cases. Moreover, if the 
Constitution requires that a patent advance or add to the sum of useful 
knowledge, how can a design patent be constitutional?”89 Frustratingly, the 
court fails to answer its own question although it does ultimately enforce the 
design patent in question.90 
The other two potential cases on the constitutionality of design patents 
follow the pattern of the C.C.P.A. and Courts of Appeal cases discussed 
above. Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Products, Inc.,91 
obliquely raised the constitutional issue by indicating that what was claimed 
failed to meet the constitutional requirement of invention reflected in the 
Section 103 nonobviousness condition for patentability. Article I, Section 
8, Clause 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “(t)o promote 
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.” In exercise of that power, Congress enacted Title 35 of 
the United States Code specifying the procedure and requirements for 
obtaining a patent [including s]ection 171 of Title 35, providing 
specifically for design patents . . . .92 
Similarly, Columbus Plastic Products v. Rona Plastic Corp.,93 stated 
that 
[u]nder somewhat stringent requirements of inventiveness in this circuit, 
any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture, 
might be protected by design patent. But these remedies grant a monopoly 
of sharply limited duration, and then only upon the basis of a legislative 
appraisal of the conflicting interests involved which is specifically 
authorized by the Constitution [in] Art. I, Sec. 8.94 
Consequently, while both cases acknowledge the constitutional issue 
and do not rule that design patents are constitutionally infirmed, there is also 
a lack of legal argument and support for the constitutionality of them and no 
indication that the issue of Article I constitutionality was actually litigated. 
 
 88.  Hadco Products, Inc. v. Lighting Corp. of Am., 312 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (E.D. Pa. 1970), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom., Hadco Products, Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 
1972). 
 89.  Id. at 1177 (footnotes omitted). 
 90.  See id. at 1185. The Court of Appeals reversed this case on the ground that the design patent in 
question was obvious in light of the prior art. See Hadco, 462 F.2d at 1272–73. 
 91.  418 F. Supp. 224 (D.C. Colo. 1976), aff’d, 597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 92.  Id. at 227–28 (citations omitted). 
 93.  111 F. Supp. 623, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
 94.  Id. at 625 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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2.  Basic Requirement of the Patent Clause: An Industrial Design 
Must Be a “Useful Art” and an “Inventor’s” “Discovery” 
As shown, there is no persuasive legal authority establishing the 
constitutionality of design patents under the Patent Power.95 Those courts 
that have enforced them have done so without a convincing argument being 
made for either their validity or invalidity under the Constitution. This 
section of the paper will develop that argument. The result of this articulation 
raises doubt concerning the Article I sufficiency of design patents. 
Initially, the Constitutional language—“To promote the Progress 
of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries”96—must start the analysis. Three 
phrases from the clause must be understood: “useful arts,” “inventors,” and 
“discoveries.” Each will be discussed in turn. 
a.  “Useful Arts” 
There has yet to be definitive case law that establishes the meaning of 
the term “useful arts” as it is used in Clause 8. In fact, the term seems to be 
appear in a significant number of copyright cases,97 suggesting that the courts 
have not read the clause carefully as copyrights should advance “science” as 
that term was understood in the 1700s not “useful arts.”98 
Recently, however, a Supreme Court concurring opinion discussed the 
term “useful arts” in some depth.99 The opinion stated: 
Noah Webster’s first American dictionary defined the term “art” as the 
“disposition or modification of things by human skill, to answer the 
purpose intended,” and differentiated between “useful or mechanic” arts, 
on the one hand, and “liberal or polite” arts, on the other. Although other 
dictionaries defined the word “art” more broadly, Webster’s definition 
likely conveyed a message similar to the meaning of the word 
“manufactures” in the earlier English statute. And we know that the term 
“useful arts” was used in the founding era to refer to manufacturing and 
similar applied trades. Indeed, just days before the Constitutional 
 
 95.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See, e.g., Greenberg v. National Geographic Soc., 533 F.3d 1244, 1272 n.27 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(“This broad protection encourages authors to create more works and thereby advance the progress of 
science and useful arts.” (emphasis added)); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (“The Founding 
Fathers gave Congress the power to give authors copyrights in order “[t]o promote the progress of Science 
and useful arts.” (emphasis added)). 
A search of Westlaw’s Allfeds database shows 36 cases where both “useful arts” and “definition” appear 
in the same paragraph. See ALL FEDERAL CASES (ALLFEDS), http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Sept. 
10, 2015). One third of these were copyright cases. See id. 
 98.  See supra part II.A.1. 
 99.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3243–44 (2013) (Stevens, concurring). 
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Convention, one delegate listed examples of American progress in 
“manufactures and the useful arts,” all of which involved the creation or 
transformation of physical substances. Numerous scholars have suggested 
that the term “useful arts” was widely understood to encompass the fields 
that we would now describe as relating to technology or “technological 
arts.”100 
In his discussion, Justice Stevens quoted a law review article by 
Professor John Thomas that distinguished what the useful arts are by putting 
them in contrast with what would not qualify. The article, and thus the 
concurring opinion, would limit the useful arts to the scope established by 
“[the Framers of the Constitution who] undoubtedly contemplated the 
industrial, mechanical and manual arts of the late eighteenth Century, in 
contrast to the seven ‘liberal arts’ and the four ‘fine arts’ of classical 
learning.”101 
The issue this raises is clear. Design patents do not address the 
“industrial, mechanical or manual arts” by the very definition of the 
statute;102 indeed, a design patent excludes these very things.103 
In summary, the patent power allows for the protection of the “useful 
arts:” things that are “[o]f practical use, as for doing work; producing 
material results; supplying common needs.”104 The design of a product does 
not meet this requirement. Consequently, whatever may be advanced by a 
design patent, it is not the constitutionally mandated “useful arts.” 
b.  “Inventor” 
The party that can be granted a patent for advancing the “useful arts” 
under the constitution is an “inventor.”105 This term, too, has a meaning that 
 
 100.  Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 101.  John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1164 (1999). 
Professor Thomas provides a definition for the liberal and fine arts by quoting Robert Coulter’s article, 
The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, Part II, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 487, 494 (1952): “The seven historic 
‘liberal arts’ were: grammar, logic (dialectics), rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy[.] 
The four ‘fine arts’ were: painting, drawing, architecture and sculpture; to which were often added: 
poetry, music, dancing and drama.” Thomas, 40 B.C. L. REV. at 1164 n.189. 
 102.  See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012) (“Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an 
article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.” (emphasis added)). 
 103.  See Spaulding v. Guardian Light Co., 267 F.2d 111, 112 (7th Cir. 1959) (“A design patent 
cannot be obtained to protect a mechanical function or cover an article whose configuration affects its 
utility alone.”); Application of Weil, 201 F.2d 946, 947–48 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (“It is well settled, however, 
that a design patent cannot be granted for the protection of utilitarian advances over the prior art.”); 
Weisgerber v. Clowney, 131 F. 477, 480 (C.C.D.N.J. 1904) (“There may be no objection to the article to 
which it relates being useful as well as ornamental, but the attempt to patent a mechanical function, under 
cover of design, is a perversion of the privilege given by the statute.”). 
 104.  RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICT. 2097 (2d ed. 1993). 
 105.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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calls design patents into question although not as conclusively as 
consideration of “useful arts” did. 
The patent act’s definition of “inventor” is exceedingly unhelpful. “The 
term ‘inventor’ means the individual . . . who invented or discovered the 
subject matter of the invention.”106 Other than limiting the term to human 
individuals,107 the definition tells us no more than an inventor is someone 
who invents. The case law is only slightly more helpful. As one court stated, 
an “‘Inventor,’ in patent law, is the person who conceived patented 
invention. Conception, in turn, is the formation in the mind of the inventor, 
of a definite and permanent idea of complete and operative invention as it is 
hereafter to be applied in practice.”108 As this definition shows, the courts are 
more interested in knowing who the inventor is as that is the party who can 
file a patent application than they are in knowing what an inventor is.109 
The common definitions for “inventor” are more helpful. An “inventor” 
is one who “originate[s] or create[s] [something] as a product of one’s own 
ingenuity, experimentation, or contrivance.”110 “Ingenuity,” in turn, does 
seem to suggest that the creator of an industrial design can be an inventor as 
it means “cleverness or skillfulness of conception or design.”111 As the 
essence of a design patent is “cleverness . . . of . . . design,” this aspect of 
inventorship is demonstrated in industrial design. On the other hand, neither 
“experimentation”—”a test, trial, or tentative procedure; an act or operation 
for the purpose of discovering something unknown or of testing a principle 
supposition, etc.”112—nor “contrivance”—”something [‘plan[ned] with 
ingenuity, devise[d], invent[ed]’]; a device esp. a mechanical one”113—are 
apropos to design patents. Fundamentally, industrial designs are created 
through a process of creativity, but they are not discovered. Similarly, they 
are not unknown and are not found through a process of testing. They are 
certainly not a contrivance as that term so strongly implies a mechanically 
operating object. “Far from being a . . . science, design is more akin to an art 
 
 106.  35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (2012). 
 107.  See Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will 
the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1695–1702 (1997). 
 108.  University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 105 F. Supp.2d 1164, 
1176 (D. Colo. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 109.  See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 110.  RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICT. 1640 (2d ed. 1993). 
 111.  Id. at 981. 
 112.  Id. at 681. 
 113.  Id. at 442. 
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form. Unlike inventors of utility inventions, designers do not seek to solve 
specific . . . problems with their designs.”114 
The Oxford Dictionary has a similar understanding of the term 
“inventor” defining it as someone who “find[s] out [or] discover[s], esp. by 
search or endeavor.”115 In other words, you invent something by having a 
goal in mind and then seeking ways to achieve that goal. But this does not 
describe the process of industrial design: 
For example, to say that a particular product is “ugly” or “looks cheap” 
does not identify a specific problem in any meaningful way, such that a 
hypothetical designer exercising ordinary skill could point to an “obvious 
solution” to make the product appear more attractive or expensive. Given 
the subjectivity of aesthetics, ten designers may form ten different yet 
valid opinions as to why the product looks ugly or cheap. Likewise, all ten 
designers may hold different yet valid opinions about how the product’s 
design could be modified to make the product more appealing.116 
It is not completely wrong to claim that an “inventor” creates an 
industrial design. At the same time, however, this stretches the meaning of 
the word. Consequently, while the constitutional term does not preclude 
design patents in any absolute way, it suggests that design patents are on the 
extreme edge of inventorship. 
c.  “Discovery” 
As with the other two constitutional terms, the match between an 
industrial design and a “discovery” is feeble. Here, far more than with 
“inventor” and even more than with “useful arts,” design patents grind 
against the definition. 
A “discovery” is something “see[n], [gotten] knowledge of, learn[ed] 
of, [found], or [found] out; gain[ed] sight or knowledge of; . . . notice[d] or 
realize[d].”117 None of these methods from the definition describe what 
happens in the creation of a design. One does not just see it or stumble across 
it; one must originate the ornamental design and apply it to the product in 
question. Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary defines “discovery” as something 
“[found] unexpectedly or during a search; bec[a]me aware of (a fact or 
situation); [was] the first to find or observe (a place, substance, or scientific 
 
 114.  Janice M. Mueller & Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the “Impossible Issue” of 
Nonobviousness in Design Patents, 99 KY. L.J. 419, 438–39 (2011) 
 115.  1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICT. 1424 (6th ed. 2007). 
 116.  Mueller & Brean, supra note 114, at 439. 
 117.  RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICT. 1640 (2d ed. 1993) 
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phenomenon) . . . .”118 This definition, too, suggests that discoveries occur 
when an existing thing or concept is found rather than being crafted from a 
series of artistic choices. 
Further, unlike utility patents, design patents do not legally protect 
something that is engineered.119 If an inventor is crafting a novel plow, for 
example, it will be possible to compare the operation of the new plow against 
the old. The comparative worth of the two plows can be analyzed and, if the 
new plow is a better plow, an improvement patent can be obtained.120 Design 
patents cannot be analyzed this way as the “better” design is completely a 
subjective determination: 
Any “problem” that a designer addresses via aesthetics is necessarily ill-
defined, elusive, and subjective. For example, to say that a particular 
product is “ugly” or “looks cheap” does not identify a specific problem in 
any meaningful way, such that a hypothetical designer exercising ordinary 
skill could point to an “obvious solution” to make the product appear more 
attractive or expensive. Given the subjectivity of aesthetics, ten designers 
may form ten different yet valid opinions as to why the product looks ugly 
or cheap. Likewise, all ten designers may hold different yet valid opinions 
about how the product’s design could be modified to make the product 
more appealing.121 
In other words, “good” designs cannot be “found,” “learned about,” or 
“observed”; they must be created. Fundamentally, the process of engineering 
that leads to discoveries that are subject to utility patents—the scientific 
method combined with trial and error—is not the process that leads to the 
cosmetic embellishments that are patented as a design. 
3.  Maybe Design Patents Are Unconstitutional 
a.  Design Patents Cannot Be Justified Under the Patent Power 
Consequently, it is likely that design patents cannot be justified under 
the Patent Power in Article I, Section 8, Clause. 8. Industrial designs are not 
part of the “useful arts.” They are not created by “inventors.” They are 
created, not “discover[ed].” As a design fails to meet any of the constitutional 
 
 118.  OXFORD DICT. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/english/discover (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2015). 
 119.  Evidence of this can be found in the qualifications needed for patent examiners. See Patent 
Examiner Positions, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2003, 
02:21:03 am) (noting that “scientists and engineers” examine the “discoveries of inventors” while no such 
requirement is placed on those who examine design patents). 
 120.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain 
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” (emphasis added)). 
 121.  Mueller & Brean, supra note 114 at 439. 
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requisites for a grant of a patent, including them within the Patent Act seems 
inappropriate as it exceeds congressional power. 
The premise of this, though, is that the patent and copyright powers 
must be completely dichotomous. As shown earlier, this is clearly what the 
language says,122 which matches the intent of the drafters.123 Constitutional 
law is rarely that clean, however, so an examination of the gap between 
patents and copyrights is necessary. 
b.  Is It Allowable to Issue a Patent Under the Copyright Power? 
Clearly, industrial design could be protected under the Copyright Act.124 
The constitutional authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 to provide 
copyright protections for industrial design also seems clear.125 This section 
will review each of these and will then reach the ultimate question about 
whether the copyright power can be used to sustain a patent. 
Statutorily, the Copyright Act expressly protects “pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works.”126 These are defined within the act: 
Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-dimensional and 
three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, 
prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and 
technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall 
include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their 
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned . . . .127 
Industrial designs, whether two- or three-dimensional, would normally 
be considered a form of “applied art,”128 except that Congress wished to 
exclude pure forms of industrial design from being copyrighted.129 
Consequently, Congress imposed significant limitations on the coverage of 
“pictorial, graphic and sculptural works” to exclude most industrial designs: 
 
 122.  See supra part II.A.1. 
 123.  See supra part II.A.2. 
 124.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012). Although all industrial design seems to be within the scope 
of a copyright under the Act under § 102(a), there are statutory limitations that greatly limit the industrial 
designs that can claim protection. These will be discussed in this section, infra. 
 125.  Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–18 (1954) (refusing to rule directly on the constitutional 
question as the parties had not properly raised the issue, but holding that “use in industry” does not make 
an work uncopyrightable). 
 126.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012). 
 127.  Id. § 101, para. 33 
 128.  See Ochre LLC v. Rockwell Architecture, Planning and Design, P.C., 530 Fed. App’x. 19, 20 
(2d Cir. 2013) (equating “applied art” and “industrial design”); RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICT. 102 
(2d ed. 1993) (“of or pertaining to those arts or crafts that have a primary utilitarian function, or to the 
designs and decorations used in these arts.”). 
 129.  H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668 (“On the 
other hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the 
Committee’s intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill.”). 
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[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be 
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the 
extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.130 
Thus, “useful articles”131—industrial designs, in other words—have 
quite limited copyright protection under the 1976 Act.132 
Although industrial design is mostly excluded from statutory 
protection,133 this is not because a copyright could not be extended to an 
industrial design under the Constitution.134 Both pictures135 and sculptures136 
have long been considered to be “writings” under the Copyright Power. 
Thus, assuming that the basic requirements for copyrightability are 
obtained—fixation137 and creativity138—copyrights can be constitutionally 
used to protect industrial design. 
Having established that industrial designs can be properly copyrighted, 
the Clause 8 interstitial question can be addressed. Can Congress grant 
patents to the writings of authors? To decide this question, the nature of the 
 
 130.  17 U.S.C. § 101, para. 33 (2012). 
 131.  The Section defines a “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that 
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is normally 
a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful article.’” Id. para 47. 
 132.  Of course, determining the line between a protectable work of authorship that is severable from 
a useful article and one that is not is nearly analytically impossible. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy 
Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (1985). Between the majority opinion and Judge Newman’s dissent in Carol 
Barnhart, eight different tests for separating the copyrightable aspects of a useful object from those that 
are not protected are discussed. See id., passim. See generally, Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and 
Industrial Design: a Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983). 
 133.  See, e.g., Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418 (“the aesthetic and artistic features of the Barnhart 
forms are inseparable from the forms’ use as utilitarian articles. . .”); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding regulations adopted by the copyright office that tended to exclude 
industrial designs from being registered). 
 134.  See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206–08 (1954) (“The constitutional power of Congress to 
confer copyright protection on works of art or their reproductions is not questioned. Petitioners assume, 
as Congress has in its enactments and as do we, that the constitutional clause empowering legislation ‘To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, includes within the 
term ‘Authors’ the creator of a picture or a statue.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 135.  See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56–58 (1884). 
 136.  See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214. 
 137.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (extending copyright to all works of authorship that are “fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression”). “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy, . . . by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.” Id.  § 101, para. 20. 
 138.  See Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that a work 
must possess “at least some minimal degree of creativity” to be copyrightable). See generally, Clifford, 
supra note 10. 
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two monopolies must be compared because, if the differences are significant, 
the transference of a power from one to the other becomes more suspect. 
Patents: Patents give the inventor a negative monopoly.139 Without the 
permission of the patent holder, “making, using, offering for sale, or selling” 
the patented design is prohibited.140 Indeed, one cannot experiment with or 
use the design for any purpose unless it is “solely for amusement, to satisfy 
idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry . . . .”141 The power granted 
by a patent is a negative power—the inventor can prevent others from 
practicing the claimed invention but may not be able to do so him or herself 
if an earlier shadowing patent exists.142 
Copyrights: Copyrights give an author much more limited rights.143 The 
primary right the author obtains is against copying144 although some 
modification of the author’s work are also included.145 If a new work is 
independently created without any form of copying of the old, both authors 
would be entitled to similar copyright rights.146 Further, many aspects of a 
work are not protected even where a copyright is claimed including, 
importantly, the ideas, concepts and principles underlying the work.147 
 
 139.  See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) (“During its term, a valid 
patent excludes all except its owner from the use of the protected process or product. This monopoly may 
be enjoyed exclusively by the patentee or he may assign the patent ‘or any interest therein’ to others.” 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 140.  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States . . . .”). 
 141.  Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 142.  See Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 688 (2014) 
(discussing how an earlier “blocking” patent can prevent use of an improvement patent). 
 143.  Cf. White v. Leanore Frocks, 120 F.2d 113, 114–15 (2d Cir. 1941) (“What they [industrial 
designers] need is rather a statute which will protect them against the plagiarism of their designs; a more 
limited protection [than design patents] and for that reason easier to obtain if the law recognized copyright 
in the subject matter at all.”). 
 144.  17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012). See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (“Absent copying there can be no 
infringement of copyright.”). 
 145.  17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that making a derivative requires the original work to be recast into another work). See generally, 
Amy B. Cohen, When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right of a Copyright Owner?, 17 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 623 (1999). 
 146.  See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217–18 (“The distinction is illustrated . . . [by] two men, each a 
perfectionist, independently making maps of the same territory. Though the maps are identical each may 
obtain the exclusive right to make copies of his own particular map, and yet neither will infringe the 
other’s copyright.” (citations omitted)); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 
1951) (“The ‘author’ is entitled to a copyright if he independently contrived a work completely identical 
with what went before; similarly, although he obtains a valid copyright, he has no right to prevent another 
from publishing a work identical with his, if not copied from his.”). 
 147.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 (“Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no 
exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea 
itself.”). 
CLIFFORD & PELTZ-STEELE - DESIGN PATENTS FINAL - WEBSITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/15  12:54 PM 
2015] THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DESIGN PATENTS 577 
Finally, all copyrights are limited where a countervailing public need for the 
work exists under the fair use doctrine,148 including where the work is used 
as the source material for a new transformative work.149 
Clearly, the differences between the two rights are significant.150 
Recently, for example, a design patent was granted for the medical “Rx” 
symbol that is used as the header on a drug prescription.151 The claim made 
in the patent is for “the ornamental design for the ‘prescription greetings 
decal,’ as shown.”152 Figure 1 of the patent claim shows the “Rx” symbol in 
the upper left corner of a square (presumably the sticker).153 Unfortunately 
for many doctors, this design patent might claim the classical medical 
prescription pad depending on how the court ultimately construes the 
limitation “decal” as it is used in the patent, raising the possibility of 
infringement for a doctor who uses the pad. Because patents carry a 
presumption of validity that can only be overcome with clear and convincing 
evidence,154 any attempt to avoid liability would be difficult and 
consequently expensive.155 
Were the same “Rx” design claimed for a copyright, significantly fewer 
rights would be obtained by its claimant. First off, independent creation of a 
design that matches the claimant’s would not infringe the copyright so a 
doctor’s independent use of the “Rx” symbol on a decal would not impose 
liability. Second, the primarily ex post analysis of copyright validity makes 
challenges significantly easier because, although registered copyrights also 
carry a presumption of validity,156 this presumption merely shifts the burden 
of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant without raising the quantum of 
proof needed to the clear and convincing level.157 
 
 148.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); infra Section III.E. 
 149.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 150.  See Alfred Bell & Co, 191 F.2d at 103 (“On that account, we have often distinguished between 
the limited protection accorded a copyright owner and the extensive protection granted a patent owner.”). 
 151.  U.S. Patent No. D690,766S (filed May 2, 2012). Although issued by the PTO, the 
appropriateness of this patent is highly questionable. See Sarah Burstein, [“Rx”] Decals, DESIGN LAW 
BLOG (last visited Sept. 10, 2015), http://design-law.tumblr.com/post/63042465731/seriously-issued-
this-week-d690-766-for-a. 
 152.  U.S. Patent No. D690,766S (filed May 2, 2012). 
 153.  Id. at 2. The design patent claim is not being reprinted within this article as to do so might 
constitute the use of the patent, subjecting the authors to a patent infringement suit. 
 154.  See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–48 (2011). 
 155.  See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013) (describing “bottom-feeder” patent trolls who litigate low (or no) quality 
patents in hopes of obtaining a quick nuisance-value settlement); Guerrini, supra note 10, at 3101 (linking 
patent trolls and patent quality). 
 156.  See, e.g., Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1965). 
 157.  See Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1019 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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These differences between patents and copyrights are not of modern 
origin.158 English law as it existed when the Constitution was drafted 
distinguished in the kinds of rights that should be associated with each 
protection scheme.159 Although it is close to impossible to be certain about 
anything that was drafted in the late 1700s, particularly where the 
motivational documentation for the actions taken in creation of Article I, 
Clause 8, Section 8 of the Constitution is sparse, it is nevertheless appropriate 
to conclude that the dichotomy written into Clause 8 was either deliberate or 
the most reasonable interpretation of the constitutional language.160 Being 
dichotomous, the answer to the ultimate question of this half of the article is 
“no”—Congress may not grant a patent to works that are only qualified for 
copyrights. 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS 
Even if design patents pass constitutional muster as an appropriate 
exercise of Article I power, their capacity for expression sets them apart from 
utility patents and requires that they be constrained by the First Amendment. 
In other words, if design patents themselves are constitutional, then there 
must be a free expression or “fair use” defense to design patent infringement. 
The defense is essential to ensure that patent law does not extinguish art, 
commentary, parody, and criticism, especially when the subsequent user of 
a patented design is not an economic competitor of the design owner. The 
intellectual property trade-off in such a cases—the public grant of exclusive 
property rights as reward and incentive for continuing productivity and 
ultimate contribution to the public domain—is outweighed by the public 
interest in the subsequent use. 
A “hybrid” species of intellectual property,161 design patents have some 
in common with trademarks, but far more in common with copyrights; 
indeed, they have more in common with their cousins copyrights than with 
their statutory sisters utility patents. When examining the competing public 
 
 158.  Compare Statute on Monopolies, 21 JAC. 1, ch. 3 (1623) (limiting patents to “working or 
making of any manner of new manufactures”) with Statute of Anne, 8 ANN., c. 19 (1710) (granting rights 
to the author to control reprinting of books). See generally, 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS 
§ 1:6 (4th ed. online update 2013); 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1.5 (online update 
Mar., 2014). 
 159.  See sources cited in note 158, supra. 
 160.  Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_43.html. 
 161.  J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2432, 2459 (1994). See also Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of 
the Design Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531, 532, 609 (2009–10) (explaining inappropriateness of 
utility patent system to design protection, especially with regard to “non-obvious” requirement). 
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policies of intellectual property and free expression, commonalities with 
copyright dominate the analysis because the use of a patented design 
constitutes expression—communication of ideas between people—in a way 
that the use of a utility-patented thing or process does not. Thus policy 
dictates that when allegedly infringing use of a patented design is expressive, 
the infringement analysis must account for countervailing free expression 
norms in a way that the utility patent infringement analysis need not. Various 
analyses in the law already exist to fill this gap; in particular, the copyright 
fair use doctrine provides the best fit with design patents and should be 
incorporated into design patent infringement law. 
A.  Copyrights and Free Expression 
The concept of balance between intellectual property, in part as 
authorized by the IP Clause of the Constitution,162 and freedom of 
expression, as guaranteed by the First Amendment,163 is now well entrenched 
in constitutional law.164 It is well settled as a matter of originalism that the 
absolutist command of 1791, that the government “make no law. . .abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press,”165 negated neither the 1789 IP 
Clause166 nor the Commerce Clause,167 and the 1868 incorporation of the Bill 
of Rights to the states168 did not negate the state law of trademark,169 tort,170 
 
 162.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 163.  Id. amend. I. See also id. amend. XIV, § 1 (incorporating the First Amendment through the Due 
Process Clause). 
 164.  E.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash 
Between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 19–24 (2001) (discussing competing economic rationales for the IP 
Clause in balance with the First Amendment). Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 US. 74, 
84–85 (1980) (approving, upon heightened scrutiny in due process and takings challenge, expressive 
activity authorized by state law despite infringement of right to exclude others from real property). Accord 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (“When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of 
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain 
mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.”). 
 165.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 166.  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“The Copyright Clause and 
First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, 
copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed, copyright’s purpose 
is to promote the creation and publication of free expression.”); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–91 
(2012). 
 167.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. E.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) 
(articulating First Amendment intermediate scrutiny test for regulation of interstate commercial 
telecommunications market implicating freedom of speech). 
 168.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 169.  E.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. 
Rev. 381, 407 (2008). 
 170.  E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
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nor, insofar as not preempted, copyright.171 But the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized the need to strike a balance between IP and free expression, 
especially through a body of case law in copyright in the last century. Article 
I powers, expressed through federal law, and state law are limited by the 
freedom of expression.172 Thus IP rights, whether constitutional, statutory, or 
common law, are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.173 
Free expression may be accommodated in IP by examining the public 
interest that warrants the IP right to begin with,174 then weighing that interest 
against the public interest in free expression.175 In the case of copyrights and 
patents, public interest supports a constructive property right in an 
abstraction. The rights are granted with legislative constraints and for a 
limited to time to further the public interest in a market that incentivizes the 
continuing production of similar valuable property. Our focus here is on 
copyright law, principally because of its shared rationale with design patent 
law under the IP Clause.176 
 
 171.  E.g., National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing 
misappropriation claim in New York law insofar as not preempted by federal copyright law). 
 172.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006) 
(recognizing that “legislation that raises armies,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12–13, “is subject to First 
Amendment constraints”). 
 173.  E.g., Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 164, at 31. 
 174.  See id. at 16–17 (articulating essentiality of IP system to efficient marketplace). 
 175.  E.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877, 878–84 (1963) (articulating free speech-public interests in self-fulfillment, truth, democracy, and the 
balancing of social stability and change). See, e.g., Megan D. Hargraves, Note, Constitutional Law—First 
Amendment & Freedom of Speech—Students May Be Regarded As Closed-Circuit Recipients of the 
State’s Anti Drug Message: The Supreme Court Creates A New Exception to the Tinker Student Speech 
Standard. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 565, 567 (2008) 
(recognizing influence of Emerson). See also Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 164, at 6–7 (articulating 
essentiality of free speech to free society relative to need to protect IP); Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, 
on-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
243, 282 (2001) (elaborating on latter Emerson interest, citing RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN 
OPEN SOCIETY 13 (1992)). 
 176.  In addition to its commercial and non-constitutional rationale, trademark law is for many 
reasons ill-suited as a model for design patent fair use. A broad range of doctrinal approaches populate a 
rough and unsettled terrain at the border of trademark and free speech, all pointing to some manner of 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Prominent is the test of Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d 
Cir. 1989), under which, when a mark is used in an “artistic work”—”such as art works, motion pictures 
and books, not . . . ordinary, non-artistic, commercial speech.” 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:144.50 (4th ed.). See also 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 10:22 (4th ed.) (citing Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008))—a 
court must balance the mark owner’s interest in precluding confusion against the user’s free speech rights, 
thus recognizing the public interest at stake on each side. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. “[T]hat balance will 
normally not support application of the [Lanham] Act [1] unless the title has no artistic relevance to the 
underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, [2] unless the title explicitly misleads 
as to the source or the content of the work.” Id. For explicit misleading, likelihood of confusion must be 
“‘particularly compelling to outweigh the First Amendment . . . .’” 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:144.50 (4th ed.) (quoting Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications 
Intern., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1370 (2d Cir. 1993)). Extremely limited doctrines of “fair use” operate in 
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Authorized by Article I of the Constitution, copyrights exemplify the 
incentive rationale for IP, “promot[ing] science . . . by securing for limited 
times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their . . . writings . . . .”177 The 
notion that authors require protection for expressive works as an incentive to 
produce and publish them is not without detractors,178 but that is the widely 
accepted theory that grounds modern copyrights. 
Copyrights are in inherent tension with freedom of expression, because 
the very definition of that which may be copyrighted requires “fix[ation] in 
a[] tangible medium of expression.”179 Thus an author’s or owner’s assertion 
of copyright, for its duration, necessarily subtracts from the range of 
permissible expression for all others in the society. Copyright law the world 
over recognizes the need for balance with free expression, and the fair use 
doctrine strikes the balance in U.S. law.180 Abundant treatises thoroughly 
explicate copyright law and its compromise with free expression; a full 
treatment is beyond the scope of this work. But a short recitation of the origin 
and essential standards of free expression and fair use in copyright here 
informs our ultimate thesis, that a fair use defense based on the copyright 
model is the best methodology to balance design patents and free expression. 
 
the context of infringement by dilution. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012); 4 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 24:67, 24:124 (4th ed.). See also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (2012) (fair use in Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act). For discussion 
of the limited manner in which trade dress protects industrial design, see Richard G. Frenkel, Intellectual 
Property in the Balance: Proposals for Improving Industrial Design Protection in the Post-TRIPs Era, 
32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 531, 558–65 (1999). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A) (2012) (trade dress 
dilution); 1 TRADE DRESS PROTECTION § 10:2 (2d ed.) (same); Anthony E. Dowell, Note, Trade Dress 
Protection of Product Designs: Stifling the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts for an Unlimited 
Time, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 137, 191–92 (1994–95) (calculating that trade dress and copyright, with 
their indefinite and long terms, respectively, so undermine the innovation-exclusivity balance as to 
demand preemption by patent). 
 177.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 178.  E.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 282–84 (1970). 
 179.  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”). See also Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 164, at 19 (recognizing risk to free 
expression inherent in IP protection of information and ideas). 
 180.  See, e.g., Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (“the ‘fair use’ defense [is] recognized in our jurisprudence 
as [a] ‘built-in First Amendment accommodation[].” (footnote omitted)). For a short treatment of the 
position that a policy-based First Amendment defense may exist distinct from fact-driven fair use 
analysis, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Free Expression: The Convergence of Conflicting 
Normative Frameworks, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 45, 69–71 (2004). Various authors furthermore 
examine copyright itself as a fundamental norm of human rights. See, e.g., Maurizio Borghi, Copyright 
and Truth, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L., vol. 12, no. 1, at 12–14 (2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358893, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2358893 (emphasizing relationship 
between copyright and truth-seeking). 
CLIFFORD & PELTZ-STEELE - DESIGN PATENTS FINAL - WEBSITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/15  12:54 PM 
582 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 14:2 
Cousin to “fair dealing” in foreign law,181 fair use roots reach to 18th-
century British law (pre-dating the Constitution)182 and Judge Story’s famous 
19th-century opinion in Folsom v. Marsh.183 Under the 1831 Copyright Act, 
Judge Story found violation in the revelation of previously unpublished 
correspondence of President Washington, though the court searched for “a 
justifiable use. . .such as the law recognizes as no infringement.”184 The 
concept of justification evolved into “fair use” in U.S. federal courts, 
ultimately manifesting as at least four factors stated in the 1976 Copyright 
Act: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.185 
Though none is dispositive186 and non-listed factors can also be 
considered,187 economic effects are important, given the economic rationale 
for IP protection.188 The relationship between the First Amendment and fair 
use is not certain, but the Supreme Court recognized in 1985 that the former 
compels the latter.189 Patry abhorred the popular characterization of the 
statute as “codifying” common law.190 Rather, he emphasized—and the 
 
 181.  See Richard J. Peltz, Global Warming Trend? The Creeping Indulgence of Fair Use in 
International Copyright Law, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 267, 277–86 (2009) (discussing fair dealing 
and public interest defenses in foreign law, in comparison with U.S. fair use). See also 4 PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 10:2 (“kissing cousin”). 
 182.  See Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141, 143, 26 E.R. 489 (Ct. Ch. 1740), 
http://copy.law.cam.ac.uk/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_uk_1741 (recounting 
counsel’s argument that British copyright in 1710 Statute of Anne should be construed liberally to 
incentivize production of useful works, namely an abridgment that evidences the subsequent author’s 
“invention, learning, and judgment”). 
 183.  9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 184.  Id. at 348–49 (analyzing “the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the copies, and 
the degree in which the original authors may be injured”). Judge Story went so far as to express his hope 
for a settlement, recognizing that the defendants’ “meritorious labors” were geared to educational use. Id. 
at 349. 
 185.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 186.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
 187.  The four criteria are introduced with the word “include.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Congress 
defined “include” in the statute to be “illustrative and not limitative.” Id. § 101, para. 24. 
 188.  Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 164, at 43–44. 
 189.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterps. , 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (citing Schnapper 
v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (1981); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1.10[B], at 1–70, n.24 (1984); 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 140–42 (1985)). 
 190.  4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 10:8. 
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Court emphasized in 1994—that Congress, per its own committee reports, 
meant only to “recogniz[e]” fair use191 and to “continue the common-law 
tradition of fair use adjudication.”192 Thus courts should preserve “[t]he 
constitutional balance between sufficient incentives to authors and 
reasonable, unconsented-to and uncompensated uses by the public can be 
maintained only if courts fully and comfortably don their common-law 
hats.”193 Public interest, not authors’ interests, is paramount.194 
While fair use embodies free expression as an affirmative defense to 
copyright infringement, copyright in the first instance also bears structural 
protection for free expression.195 As a threshold matter, a work must be 
minimally creative, or “original,”196 to warrant copyright. The meaning of 
the requirement is highly debated, but it is “central” to the Article I balance 
between incentivizing productivity and protecting economic monopoly.197 
The principle is important in First Amendment law because the republication 
 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), U.S.C.C.A.N. 1976, at 
5659; S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 62 (1975), U.S.C.C.A.N. 1976, at 5679). Patry lamented courts’ infidelity 
to this understanding. While placing “the lion’s share of the blame . . . squarely on copyright owners’ 
wildly inflated views of the scope of their rights,” he also accused courts of “squeeze[ing] a common-law 
concept of great flexibility and scope into the straight jacket of statutory words meant merely to evoke 
but not encapsulate and certainly not to constrain the doctrine.” 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, 
§ 10:1.50. 
 193.  4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 10:8. 
 194.  Id. § 10:1.50. 
 195.  Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 164, at 39. 
 196.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Works lacking sufficient creativity are not eligible for copyright 
protection; importantly, simply working hard to produce a work does not justify a copyright absent 
creativity. See Clifford, supra note 10. The paradigmatic “sweat of the brow” case, involving a telephone 
directory, is Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that the white 
pages of a telephone book cannot be copyrighted as insufficient creativity is shown). 
 There have been increasingly ardent calls to depart from this norm in the case of databases, see 
Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies: Reconceptualizing Property in 
Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 784–90 (2003); e.g., L.M. BROWNLEE, IP DUE DILIGENCE IN 
CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS § 9.3 (2014), which have been the source of trans-Atlantic angst, e.g., John 
Edwards, Note, Has the Dreaded Data Doomsday Arrived?: Past, Present, and Future Effects of the 
European Union’s Database Directive on Database and Information Availability in the European Union, 
39 GA. L. REV. 215, 215–18 (2004), and in the debated but narrow context of the hot news doctrine, see 
generally VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND, NEWS PIRACY AND THE HOT NEWS DOCTRINE: ORIGINS IN LAW 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 1–8 (2005). 
 197.  2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 3:33. Patry acknowledged that the theory is not 
universally accepted. Id. § 3:33, n.1 (positing that the originality requirement serves primarily to ease the 
evidentiary burden on courts confronted with “two indistinguishable works (indistinguishable because 
they contain trivial amounts of expression . . . )” citing, WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 90 (2003)). See also Clifford, supra note 
10. Perhaps owing to uncertainty over what the requirement means, it more often arises in infringement 
cases than at the threshold of copyright, despite its definitional nature. 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra 
note 158, § 3:33. Of course, unlike patents, copyright registration is not a prerequisite for obtaining legal 
rights. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2012). In fact, registration often does not occur until just prior to litigation as 
registration is a prerequisite for filing an action by most U.S. copyright holders. See id. § 411(a). 
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of facts remains unhindered by copyright as long as the republication carries 
over no injection of creativity from the original expression.198 
The fixation and creativity requirements for copyright furthermore 
bolster the idea-expression dichotomy, by which copyright protects only 
expression and cannot preclude the taking and reuse of the ideas 
communicated by the expression.199 Accordingly, the law expressly denies 
copyright to the ideas that animate a protected work.200 Patry criticized the 
popular conception of dichotomy, positing instead an “expression 
continuum,” from idea to embodiment, which conveys the essence of the 
fact-finder’s job, distinguishing among shades of gray that which the law 
protects against copying from that which may be copied.201 The essence of 
the distinction anyway serves “to accommodate First Amendment values” in 
copyright law.202 The Supreme Court recognized the connection in 1985203 
and reiterated in 2003204 and 2012205 that “copyright law contains built-in 
First Amendment accommodations,” namely the idea-expression dichotomy 
and the fair use defense.206 
The most important modern case that models reconciliation of 
copyright and free expression is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.207 Salient 
here is the nature of the use of the copyrighted materials in Campbell, an 
admittedly imitated song melody and lyrics, although arguably as a 
parody.208 Parody is especially problematic at the juncture of intellectual 
property and free expression, because for a parody to be successful, the 
author must republish enough of the original to evoke the resemblance in the 
perception of the audience—even better to create, for a moment, the 
 
 198.  See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 101–04 (1879). 
 199.  E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 4:31. 
 200.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”). 
 201.  2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 4:36. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 
45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand) (establishing the series of abstractions test). 
 202.  2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 4:44. 
 203.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterps. 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (citing inter alia, 
as example, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726, n.* (1971) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (iterating in landmark prior restraint case scope of copyright as exclusive of ideas)). 
 204.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 205.  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 835, 890 (2012). 
 206.  Eldred v. Ashcroft , 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). Specifically in the context of the 1998 Copyright 
Term Extension Act in that case, the Court also pointed to an archiving privilege, 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) 
(2012), and a small-business exemption from broadcast music royalties, id. § 110(5)(B). Eldred, 537 U.S. 
at 220. 
 207.  510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 208.  See id. at 572–73. 
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mistaken impression that the audience is perceiving the original, thus the 
very confusion that evidences infringement in copyright and trademark 
analysis.209 At the same time, parody is a time-honored American political 
tradition, so lies at the heart of First Amendment protection for political 
speech and social commentary.210 
Applying the fair use factors, the Court refused to find the defendant’s 
commercial motive as presumptively contrary to fair use in “purpose and 
character” analysis.211 The Court found “not much help” in “nature” analysis, 
because “parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive 
works.”212 The Court conducted “amount and substantiality” analysis 
mindful of the defendant’s legitimate parodic purpose, “to ‘conjure up’ at 
least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit 
recognizable.”213 In this light, even the parodist’s taking from the “heart” of 
the original is not necessarily fatal.214 
On the fourth factor, market effect, the Court emphasized the 
transformative nature of parody, which typically renders a product that is not 
a “market replacement” for the original.215 Critically on the oft weighty 
fourth factor, the Court observed that even when “a lethal parody, like a 
scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a 
harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”216 The relevant market for fair 
use analysis in such a case is the market for “critical commentary” (or similar 
derivative work),217 like the defendant’s work, not the market for the target 
of the commentary, the plaintiff’s work. 
The Court in Campbell scarcely mentioned the First Amendment,218 but 
the notion of constitutional protection for critical speech ran deep in the 
opinion. In later construction of the Copyright Term Extension Act in 2003, 
the Court cited Campbell in the heart of an iteration of copyright’s balance 
with the First Amendment, parallel to fair use “‘latitude for scholarship and 
comment’” and complementary to the idea-expression dichotomy.219 
 
 209.  See id. at 580–81. 
 210.  E.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54–55 (1988). 
 211.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583. 
 212.  Id. at 586. 
 213.  Id. at 588. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. at 591. 
 216.  Id. at 591–92. 
 217.  Id. at 593. 
 218.  See id. at 583 (citing Yankee Publishing Inc. v. News America Publishing, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 
267, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), and noting that the District Court applied the First Amendment to parodies). 
 219.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556–560; 
citing Campbell, 510 U.S. 569). 
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A final point of friction between copyright and free expression arose in 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to fetter Congress in construction of Article I’s 
“limited times” authorization. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, upholding the 1998 
Copyright Term Extension Act against various constitutional challenges, the 
Supreme Court employed the deference of mere rationality review to test the 
scope of congressional power.220 As mentioned above, the Court explicitly 
recognized the shared common function of the Copyright Clause and the 
First Amendment in furthering public access to knowledge.221 The Court held 
that the balance struck in the Copyright Clause itself was sufficient to resist 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.222 But the Court also observed that 
“the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights 
‘categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.’”223 
Repeatedly the Court recalled that the primary purpose of copyright 
exclusivity is public access to copyrighted work;224 a grant of property rights 
to authors is only a means to that “‘constitutional aim.’”225 
Also informative is the Eldred and Golan Courts’ inclusion of patents 
in discussing the copyright cases. In Eldred, the Court upheld retroactive 
copyright term extension partially upon analogy to the same practice in 
patent law, under the same Article I power.226 In comparing the two areas, 
the Court recognized that both patents and copyrights strive for access to 
knowledge by balancing the exclusivity incentive to innovation with anti-
monopolism.227 But the Court drew a sharp distinction between copyrights 
and patents in approach. In patents, quid pro quo is an apt description of the 
bargain, because an inventor is incentivized by a property grant to bring to 
public light a process or thing that otherwise would remain secret. In 
copyrights, “disclosure is the desired objective, not something exacted from 
the author in exchange for the copyright.”228 Furthermore, copyright law’s 
limited reach to expression, but not to fact or idea, limits the subtraction from 
the public domain. “A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of 
 
 220.  Id. at 204. 
 221.  Id. at 218–20. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. at 221. 
 224.  Id. at 205 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984)); 207 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998)); 213 (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429); 
214 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)); 219 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 
(copyright as “engine of free expression”)). 
 225.  Id. at 223 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (referencing 
IP Clause in upholding legislative condition of patentability)). 
 226.  Id. at 202–03. 
 227.  Id. at 215. 
 228.  Id. at 216. 
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any fact or idea she acquires from her reading”; in contrast, 
“patent[s]. . .prevent full use by others of the inventor’s knowledge.”229 
Similarly, in Golan, the Court cited several patent cases that upheld the 
restoration of patent rights to inventions that had briefly entered the public 
domain to sustain Congress’s restoration of copyrights to Berne works under 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.230 
Copyrights always have had an uneasy, overlapping coverage with 
product design protection.231 The 1870 Copyright Act extended art protection 
to designs as “‘fine art,’” including three-dimensional objects, while design 
patent was authorized in the same statute for works within “‘any article of 
manufacture.’”232 In a “sea change,” the 1909 Copyright Act dropped the 
“fine art” requirement.233 Patry reported that the change resulted specifically 
from bar advocacy favoring “protection of designs of useful articles,”234 
though eligibility for copyright of functional design features remained a 
point of contention for 45 years.235 
In 1954, in Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court at last ruled that 
functionality did not preclude copyright, holding that dancing statuettes were 
copyrightable even though they formed the bases for electric lamps.236 
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that copyright and design patent 
must be mutually exclusive.237 Both serve the public interest with an 
incentive-reward bargain: copyright protects expression and originality in 
“art,” while patent protects “invention of original and ornamental design.”238 
Copyright law today maps protection co-extensively with non-
functionality. “Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” are protected only 
insofar as they “can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”239 This standard 
 
 229.  Id. at 217. 
 230.  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 835, 886–87 (2012). 
 231.  For a thorough history of design protection in U.S. and foreign copyright law from 1948 to 
1976, see J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne 
Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1145–264. 
 232.  2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 3:125 & n.2 (quoting Act of July 8, 1870, 41st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198, 209, 212). 
 233.  Id. § 3:126 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1909, repealed 1978)). 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  See id. §§ 3:126–3:131. See generally Note, Protecting the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility: 
Copyright or Design Patent?, 66 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1953). 
 236.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). For our earlier discussion of the Mazer case, see 
supra text accompanying and following note 75. 
 237.  Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217. 
 238.  Id. at 217–19. 
 239.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). See also Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 
1983) (summarizing legislative history); 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 3:135 (summarizing 
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admits of simultaneous enforcement of a copyright and design patent. For 
example, the Federal Circuit, in Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony 
California, Inc., remanded for trial a case involving copyright and design 
patent infringement claims regarding ornamental features carved into the 
plaintiff’s wood furniture.240 The copyright claim reached “features 
includ[ing] a lion’s paw, ball, reeds, leaf-and-flower motifs, foliate scrolls, 
C- and S-shaped scrolls, a serpentine decoration, a seashell motif, laurel 
wreaths, an iron-canopy rail, beads, and moldings.”241 The design patent 
claimed “‘[t]he ornamental design for a bed frame’” and “show[ed] the 
complete bed frame with many ornamental features.”242 The differences in 
the analyses, side by side, is instructive, because the circuit court concluded 
that the trial court had erred in understanding both.243 
The copyright analysis begins with the identification of the protected 
work, which is ascertained, by statute, in the search to separate utilitarian 
features from artistic features.244 The analytical process then diverges in the 
circuits; the Ninth Circuit, for example, applies a two-part, conjunctive test: 
first, an “‘extrinsic test,’ . . . an objective comparison of specific expressive 
elements,” employing expert testimony; and second, an “‘intrinsic test,’ . . . 
a subjective comparison that focuses on whether the ordinary reasonable 
audience would find the works substantially similar in the ‘the total concept 
and feel . . . .’”245 The Amini trial court had been too quick to let its feature-
by-feature extrinsic analysis control the outcome. The court improperly took 
 
legislative history). With regard to copyrightable aspects of useful articles, the act further provides that 
when the articles are offered for sale or public distribution, copyright does not preclude the “making, 
distribution, or display of pictures or photographs . . . in . . . advertisements or commentaries related to 
the distribution or display . . . or in . . . news reports.” 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2012). The scope of copyright 
protection for works of visual art issued in limited editions, including the three-dimensional, was 
subsequently enhanced by the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, codified at id. § 106A, which introduced 
some of the European-conceived “moral rights” framework into U.S. law after Berne Convention 
accession. See generally, e.g., Lindsey A. Mills, Note, Moral Rights: Well-Intentioned Protection and Its 
Unintended Consequences, 90 TEX. L. REV. 443, 445–49 (2011). 
 240.  439 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See also Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental Design and 
Incremental Innovation, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 853–54 (2003) (citing jewelry as example of commercial 
art protected in copyright). Amini, used for guidance here, is explicated in Daniel H. Brean, Enough is 
Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark 
Protection for Product Design, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 325, 361–63 (2008). 
 241.  Amini, 439 F.3d at 1368. 
 242.  Id. at 1371 (quoting patent). 
 243.  Id. at 1372. 
 244.  Id. at 1368–69. For discussion of “conceptual separability” and the more lenient test for 
architecture, see Frenkel, supra note 176, at 534–35, 565–71. The separation might be easier said than 
done. See, e.g., Brean, supra note 240, at 339–41; discussion, supra note 132. 
 245.  Amini, 439 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 
2002)). See also Brean, supra note 240, at 348–49 (discussing substantial similarity in context of product 
design). But see discussion, supra note 132 (recognizing eight different tests). 
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the “total concept” question away from the jury, which is favored to decide 
it.246 
In comparison, the design patent analysis also begins by identifying that 
which is protected. Simply enough to state, the design patent reaches “non-
functional aspects of an ornamental design as seen as a whole and as shown 
in the patent.”247 Those aspects of the design are then subject to infringement 
and novelty analysis. As to infringement, the court tests whether “‘in the eye 
of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, 
two designs are substantially the same, [meaning] the resemblance is such as 
to deceive [the] observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be 
the other.’”248 The deception must flow from “overall design, 
not. . .similarities in ornamental features considered in isolation.”249 The 
ordinary observer’s analysis is informed by the points of novelty that 
distinguished the patented design from the prior art, and which arguably were 
appropriated by the accused design.250 At minimum, the plaintiff must enter 
into evidence the patent prosecution history and some contentions as to 
novelty.251 In the furniture case, the trial court was too in the weeds, 
“mistakenly analyz[ing] each element separately instead of analyzing the 
design as a whole from the perspective of an ordinary observer.”252 
Moreover, the trial court had disposed of the matter on summary judgment 
before the plaintiff had entered evidence of novelty for the fact-finder to 
consider.253 
These analyses show both differences and similarities. Both strive to 
differentiate the utilitarian, as not protected, from the artistic, as protected.254 
 
 246.  Amini, 439 F.3d at 1370. 
 247.  Id. (quoting KeyStone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1450 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993)). 
 248.  Id. at 1371 (quoting Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871)); Du Mont, 
supra note 161, at 531 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678–79 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)). See also Brean, supra note 240, at 346–47. 
 249.  Amini, 439 F.3d at 1371. 
 250.  Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676–79 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting 
conjunctive model of ordinary-observer and points-of-novelty tests, while explaining relevance of points 
of novelty to sole ordinary-observer test); Amini, 439 F.3d at 1371 (citing Oakley, Inc. v. International 
Tropic-Cal, Inc., 923 F.2d 167, 169 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). For explanation of how the consolidation of 
infringement analysis under the “ordinary observer” banner effected a shift in the burden of proof to favor 
the patent holder, see, e.g., Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh Perspective on Design Patents, 
COLO. LAW., July 2009, at 71. 
 251.  Amini, 439 F.3d at 1372. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. at 1371–72. 
 254.  These analyses are close enough to the same for our purposes here, but approaches developed 
in the courts do differ. For a thorough discussion of various approaches and the confusion surrounding 
the differences, see Frenkel, supra note 176, at 544–54. 
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Copyrights: Copyrights require originality, though upon a trifling 
threshold, just past sweat of the brow.255 In ascertaining the contours of the 
protected subject matter, copyrights focus on originality of expression. 
Expert examination of particular ornamental features is sensible in the first 
step, complemented by the lay “total feel” approach in the second. The 
copyright claim is narrative and specific as to scope, as if the protected 
design elements were “writings” in the classic sense. 
Design Patents: Design patents meanwhile focus on novelty of idea.256 
The analysis is big-picture, appropriate to the examination of ideas, much 
like as if there were a useful invention at issue. Protected content arises in 
the delta from prior art, and a design is otherwise viewed as a whole. 
Both analyses mean protection to what is new, whether original or 
novel—that is, “Progress” in the constitutional language.257 Both analyses 
focus infringement analysis on similarity, that is, the copying of expression 
or the taking of idea. Neither analysis will find infringement without testing 
for some kind of mistake or interchangeability from an observer’s 
perspective.258 
B.  Design Patents and Copyright Fair Use; Or, a Tale of Two Toilet 
Tissues 
As discussed previously, design patents are neither fish nor fowl,259 
overlapping functionally and historically with copyrights. The concept of 
design protection was known at the time the Constitution was framed, as the 
 
 255.  See Clifford,  supra note 10. 
 256.  See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 164, at 20 & n.90 (finding common ground in 
“unique[ness]” between copyright originality and patent novelty). Design patents also formally require 
non-obviousness. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Frenkel, supra note 176, at 554–56. That requirement, 
however, once heralded as near prohibitive, e.g., Brean, supra note 240, at 338, seems today to have been 
reduced to negligibility, see Burstein, Design Patent Myths—Most Designs Can’t Satisfy the Requirement 
of “Nonobviousness,” supra note 7 (touting originality analysis as more appropriate than novelty analysis 
for design protection). 
 257.  Laura Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239, 
246 (2013). Heymann articulated a “contrast” between copyright and design patent in that the former 
means to attain the “worthwhile” through the proliferation of works, while the novelty in design patent 
“is concerned with progress in a more linear sense: the development of the practice of design over time.” 
Id. at 247. She furthermore cited the Supreme Court in Mazer drawing a distinction between art for art’s 
sake and applied art. Id. at 247 n.21 (citing Gregory R. Mues, Dual Copyright and Design Patent 
Protection: Works of Art and Ornamental Designs, 49 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 543, 572 (1974–75)). With 
utilitarian function separated out in copyright analysis and design patent scope, we see no “contrast” 
remaining in this distinction. Rather, to assess art based on its application seems normatively hazardous 
from a First Amendment perspective. 
 258.  See Heymann, supra note 257, at 248. 
 259.  See supra part II.A.4; Magliocca, supra note 240, at 845 (“The protection of esthetic product 
design is the most intractable issue in intellectual property law.”). 
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British gave limited protection to design as a kind of copyright in the 
Designing and Printing of Linen Act of 1787.260 British protection extended 
beyond textiles with the Copyright and Design Act of 1839, then the Design 
Act of 1842.261 Design patents as a creature of statute in the United States 
date to 1842.262 Design patents always were regarded as things apart from 
utility patents.263 The patent commissioner by 1851 would have preferred to 
treat designs like engravings under copyright law, but that shift was never to 
be.264 Meanwhile copyrights came over time to embrace “‘works of artistic 
craftsmanship,’” excluding “‘utilitarian aspects.’”265 Today both copyrights 
and design patents may attach to a product design, regardless of whether it 
constitutes the mundane, such as the design of a concrete mixer,266 or fine 
art, as might be found in a museum.267 
Formally, if coincidentally, design patents are offspring of the patent 
family.268 Design protection today retains its location alongside patents in 
title 35 of the U.S. Code and has sui generis protection as “community 
design” in the European Union.269 Like utility patents, if not as 
burdensome,270 design patents are cumbersome and expensive to prosecute, 
 
 260.  See History of Designs, NATIONAL ARCHIVES (U.K.), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/design/d-
about/d-whatis/d-history.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 261.  See id. 
 262.  Brean, supra note 240, at 327 (citing Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, s 3, 5 Stat. 543 (1842) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012))); Du Mont, supra note 161, at 538–39. See also 
Heymann, supra note 257, at 244. 
 263.  Du Mont, supra note 161, at 538. 
 264.  Id. at 539. 
 265.  Id. (quoting 1949 regulation). 
 266.  Heymann, supra note 257, at 14 (citing In re Koehring, 37 F.2d 421, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1930)). 
Attractiveness is immaterial. E.g., Brean, supra note 240, at 336. 
 267.  The difference might lie only in the eye of the beholder. See generally, e.g., MADSONIAN 
MUSEUM OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN, http://www.madsonian.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 268.  Magliocca, supra note 240, at 850 (describing location of design protection in patent law as 
“largely an accident of circumstance”). 
 269.  See e.g., Community Design, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/CommunityDesignFactSheet.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2015). See also Brean, supra note 240, at 371–74. Proposals in the United States have ranged 
from modest refinement to the status quo, Dowell, supra note 176, at 191–92, to sui generis protection, 
e.g., Frenkel, supra note 176, at 575–79, to expanded copyright, Steve W. Ackerman, Note, Protection 
of the Design of Useful Articles: Current Inadequacies and Proposed Solutions, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1043, 1065–68 (1983); Valerie V. Flugge, Works of Applied Art: An Expansion of Copyright Protection, 
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 253–56 (1982); Ronald L. Panitch, Design Patents, ALA-ABA COURSE OF 
STUDY, C602 ALI-ABA 295, 308 (Apr. 11, 1991), to the phasing out of express design protection in 
favor of copyright and trademark, Brean, supra note 240, at 374–81. 
 270.  Design patents are substantially less burdensome in application fees, attorney fees, time to 
issuance, and litigation costs, while affording design patent holders minimum statutory damages that are 
unavailable to utility patent holders. For a comparison in 2009, see Kugler & Mueller, supra note 250. 
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a matter up front for patent attorneys and product experts.271 In contrast, 
copyrights afford protection automatically upon creation272 and offer 
additional protection through a lay-accessible registration process.273 Most 
expenses are postponed until infringement is claimed, and unlike design 
patent, copyright holders can be awarded statutory damages.274 The 14-year 
term of the design patent275 is close to the 20-year term of the utility patent276 
and far short of the life-plus- 70-, 95-, or 120-year terms of copyright.277 To 
qualify for patent, a design must be novel, non-obvious, and ornamental, the 
former two elements in common with the utility patent, and only the latter 
distinguishing design from its “useful” sibling.278 Infringement of a design 
patents is governed by the same make-use-sell-import formula as utility 
patents.279 
Looking at design patents from the perspective of their functionality, 
however, demonstrates that they have more in common with their copyright 
cousins than with their utility patent sisters. Sitting at the confluence of 
copyright and patent,280 design patents, like copyrights, protect inherently 
expressive content, in contrast with utility patents’ protection of 
“process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or composition[s] of matter.”281 
For example, qualifications for a design patent examiner focus on art—the 
domain of copyright—rather than technology—the domain of the utility 
patent.282 Maglioccca wrote of the inherently subjective character of design 
patent analysis, “Lawyers cannot just go into a phone booth and change into 
 
Kugler and Mueller also pointed out that because design patents are unpublished until issued, infringers 
might already be invested in the marketing and sale of their products when they discover their wrong. Id. 
 271.  For a short treatment of the arrangement of the application, see Panitch, supra note 269, at 302–
04. 
 272.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists. . .” (emphasis added)). 
 273.  See id. §§ 408–09; Dowell, supra note 176, at 137–38 (positing dangerousness to innovation in 
indefinite trade dress monopoly to protect design). 
 274.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 504–05 (2012). 
 275.  35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012). 
 276.  Id. § 154(a)(2). There are a variety of facts that can extend the 20-year term for a longer period, 
most dealing with a delay in issuing a patent that is caused by the Patent and Trademark Office, see id. 
§ 154(b) or by the need to obtain regulatory approval for the marketing of the product, see id. § 156. 
 277.  See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (addressing works created on or after January 1, 1978); id. §§ 303–
04 (addressing works created earlier). 
 278.  35 U.S.C. § 171; see generally, Burstein, Design Patent Myths—An Introduction, supra note 
7. 
 279.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012); see, e.g., Brean, supra note 240, at 346. 
 280.  E.g., Magliocca, supra note 240, at 850. 
 281.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 282.  Burstein, Design Patent Myths—An Introduction, supra note 7. For comparison of the design 
patent and copyright overlap in artistic product design, see Kruger & Mueller, supra note 250. 
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art critics.”283 Indeed, infringement analysis in a copyright infringement suit 
acknowledges and attempts to avoid this subjective inquiry.284 
The overlap of design patents with their cousins is nicely illustrated by 
an analogous example; consider the diamond quilting pattern in toilet tissue 
that was at issue in Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp.285 The example is especially attractive here because of its 
resemblance to the 18th-century, textile-print origin of industrial design 
protection. In an opinion that must have rubbed Georgia-Pacific raw, the 
Seventh Circuit upheld cancellation of the company’s trademark, the only 
issue on appeal.286 To the soothing comfort of competitor Kimberly-Clark, 
the court observed that Georgia-Pacific had in its own advertising touted the 
functionality of quilting for softness and moisture absorption, thus rendering 
the design to the domain of the utility patent rather than trademark.287 
Saliently for our analysis, though, successfully or not, Georgia-Pacific 
had deployed a full arsenal of IP tools to protect its diamond design, 
including copyright, trademark, utility patent, design patent, and unfair 
competition law.288 These tools cannot all be applicable simultaneously for 
the same aspect of intellectual property because of the functionality-
ornamentation dichotomy between trademarks and copyrights, on one side, 
and utility patents on the other. But had the design been held merely 
ornamental, as Georgia-Pacific argued,289 then copyright, trademark, and 
design patent could have applied simultaneously, to the exclusion of utility 
patent, demonstrating the conceptual qualities the three share. The U.S. 
Congress and courts have not embraced a doctrine of exclusive election in 
which IP owners must choose a preferred regime of protection;290 rather, the 
 
 283.  Magliocca, supra note 240, at 852. 
 284.  See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Ind., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711–14 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(describing process of determining substantial similarity). This case was selected out of the many 
establishing the point in homage to Robin Williams (1951–2014). The case involved a poster used to 
publicize his movie, Moscow on the Hudson (1984), for which he was nominated for a Golden Globe 
Award for Best Actor. R.I.P. 
 285.  Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 647 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2011). 
The case involves the more distant cousin of design patents, trademarks, rather than copyrights. The 
distinction between functionality that drives utility patents and ornamentation that drives trademarks, 
however, mirrors the same split between utility patents and copyrights. See supra part II.B.3.b. 
 286.  Id. at 732. 
 287.  Id. at 731. 
 288.  Id. at 726. 
 289.  Id. at 730. 
 290.  See, e.g., discussion of Application of Yardley case, supra text accompanying and following 
note 71; Swanson Mfg. Co. v. Feinberg-Henry Mfg. Co., 147 F.2d 500, 503–04 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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IP areas operate in overlapping spheres, each upon its native norms, rarely 
interfering with the applicability of the others.291 
Copyright protects expression, that is, here, the original expression of 
diamond design as fixed in the tangible medium of toilet tissue. Functionality 
does not preclude copyright, but non-copyrightable utilitarian features must 
be separated conceptually from copyrightable artistic features in 
infringement analysis.292 For a limited time—and barring the improbable 
independent creation, as opposed to copying293—copyright subtracts the use 
of this particular diamond expression from the marketplace of ideas. 
Meanwhile the idea of diamond-quilted toilet tissue may be freely reiterated 
in the society—for whatever it’s worth without the expression.294 
Should copyrights not be used, design patents would likely be the best 
alternative to protect any merely ornamental and nonfunctional patterns 
contained on Georgia-Pacific’s toilet paper. Consistently with the patent 
code, an infringement claim could arise from making, selling, or using the 
protected design.295 An infringement claim would test for novelty and 
demand comparison of the novel aspects of the two designs.296 Infringement 
would rest upon the ordinary observer’s potential to mistake the latter use 
for the protected use.297 
 
 291.  Heymann, supra note 257, at 256. See also Brean, supra note 240, at 355–60 (analyzing overlap 
for Statue of Liberty, classic Coca-Cola bottle, and Levi Strauss jeans pocket); Gregory R. Mues, Dual 
Copyright and Design Patent Protection: Works of Art and Ornamental Designs, 49 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
543, 568–73 (1974–75) (observing failure of election doctrine). For background on the interaction of 
copyright and design patent regimes, see Brean, supra note 240, at 330–32; Flugge, supra note 269, at 
246–47; Frenkel, supra note 176, at 539–43; Heymann, supra note 257, at 251–56; Panitch, supra note 
269, at 305–06. For exploration of the specific problem of blank-form protection in at the junction of 
copyright and design patent, see Ryan Vacca, Design Patents: An Alternative When the Low Standards 
of Copyright Are Too High?, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 325, 355–58 (2007). For background on the interaction of 
trade dress and design patent regimes, see Brean, supra note 240, at 332–36. For discussion of how 
overlapping regimes should be managed through the judicious analysis of harms and employment of 
remedies and defenses, see Heymann, supra note 257, at 241–42, 269–75; Clifford, supra note 31. 
 292.  See supra part II.B.3.b & note 132. 
 293.  See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb., 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[N]o matter how similar the two 
works may be (even to the point of identity), if the defendant did not copy the accused work, there is no 
infringement.”). 
 294.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). Of course, the idea and expression contained in the diamonds 
on the toilet paper may be so non-severable as to invoke the merger doctrine. See Herbert Rosenthal 
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971). This would not be a problem for more 
complex designs, however. 
 295.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 296.  See Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“For a 
design patent to be infringed, however, no matter how similar two items look, the accused device must 
appropriate the novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from the prior art.” (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 297.  See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871). 
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Design patents therefore have far more in common with copyrights than 
with utility patents. Utility patent infringement arises from copying, or from 
equivalence of function, manner, and result.298 Thus copyright and all patent 
infringement involves a sort of copying, notwithstanding copyright’s defense 
of independent creation. But the focus of utility patent infringement is on 
function.299 Were Georgia-Pacific to claim utility patent protection for its 
moisture-wicking toilet tissue, the analysis in an infringement claim would 
focus on the invented process.300 In contrast, both copyrights and design 
patents focus on artistic or ornamental features, whether of toilet tissue or a 
bed frame.301 Process plays no role in copyright and design patent analyses, 
which focus instead on the expression that is subtracted from the marketplace 
of ideas. Copyrights demand alienation of utilitarian aspects from their 
analysis, and design patents fail for the inclusion of functional 
characteristics. In the IP-free speech balance, market substitution is a critical 
factor in the copyright analysis, just as consumer confusion is key to 
trademark infringement,302 and observed interchangeability is key to design 
patent infringement. Where utility patents under the doctrine of equivalence, 
in the absence of plain copying, examine element by element with 
specificity, the court in copyright and design patent infringement is 
admonished to regard the defendant’s product “as a whole,” for “total 
concept and feel.”303 Rather than technological advancement that the utility 
patents promote, copyrights and design patents place at issue, and reward in 
the IP-clause bargain, artistic creation. Copyrights and design patents are 
 
 298.  See Van Kannell Revolving Door Co. v. Revolving Door & Fixture Co., 293 F.2d 261, 262 
(S.D.N.Y. 1920) (L. Hand). Cf. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) 
(discussing the doctrine of equivalence). 
 299.  See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1966) (describing the requirement that an 
invention be “useful” to qualify for a utility patent). 
 300.  See 5A-18A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[1][a] (“A fundamental tenet of patent law is that a 
patent’s scope is determined by the wording of the claim or claims.”). 
 301.  E.g., Heymann, supra note 257, at 242 (observing application of copyright and design patents 
to “items with aesthetic appeal” and exclusion of the “useful or functional”). 
 302.  Design patent furthermore has more in common with copyright than with trademark, 
considering trademark’s commercial focus and lack of constitutional dimension. See supra note 176. In 
contrast with copyright, trademark usually awaits the acquisition of secondary meaning upon the would-
be owner’s investment of time and resources. See Brean, supra note 240, at 364–66 (emphasizing 
secondary meaning in comparing trademark with design patent). Fanciful and arbitrary marks may be 
protected sooner, but their abstruse nature minimizes the risk of inadvertent infringement and ensures a 
negligible subtraction from the marketplace of ideas. Previous proposals for design patent reform have 
focused on growing the extant capacity of copyright to protect design. E.g., Ackerman, supra note 269, 
at 1068–71. Cf. supra note 269. 
 303.  See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) (design patents); Tufenkian 
Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2003) (copyrights). 
CLIFFORD & PELTZ-STEELE - DESIGN PATENTS FINAL - WEBSITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/15  12:54 PM 
596 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 14:2 
unified as they both require modest originality or novelty—even that found 
in the aesthetic appeal of toilet tissue. 
C.  The First Amendment Difference 
Copyrights structurally protect free speech, both in their definitional 
foundation and in their potent fair use defense to infringement. But in design 
patents, the First Amendment is missing from the story.304 This omission is 
attributable to multiple factors. First, insofar as design patents protect 
commercial products, infringement is likely to involve the misleading or 
false commercial expression of a business competitor. In such a case, even 
if the First Amendment applies formally, it probably poses no barrier to 
enforcement of the patents. The case would be analogous to the sideline role 
of the First Amendment in the usual case of trademark infringement by a 
competitor,305 or in consumer protection enforcement involving misleading 
or false advertising.306 
Second, design patent holders are far less likely to seek enforcement 
against a non-commercial infringer than against a commercial infringer. A 
non-commercial user, or even an artist wishful of profits, offers little reward 
in profit disgorgement. Royalties might be perceived as substantial by the 
artist-defendant, but rarely make litigation affordable in the calculus of the 
commercial plaintiff,307 particularly as there is not a generalized fee-shifting 
provision within the Patent Act.308 Further, non-commercial use is unlikely 
to interfere with patent holder profits. Even if the non-commercial use is 
disparaging of the patent holder’s product or brand, thus potentially affecting 
the market, patent enforcement might only amplify the artist-defendant’s 
 
 304.  Brean, supra note 240, at 351; Heymann, supra note 257, at 250. 
 305.  See, e.g., Tell Me More: Fumbled Patent: Is it Just a Matter of Business? (NPR radio broadcast 
June 19, 2014), available at http://www.npr.org/2014/06/19/323576751/fumbled-patent-is-it-just-a-
matter-of-business (explaining immateriality of First Amendment to trademark dispute over name of 
football team). 
 306.  E.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 412–13 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (discussing relative standards for regulation of false or misleading commercial speech and for 
regulation compelling affirmative commercial disclosures). 
 307.  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant 
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for 
the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”). 
 308.  See id. § 285; Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 
(2014) (“We hold, then, that an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect 
to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the 
facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”). 
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message.309 If the subsequent use is not disparaging, it might do as much 
good for the brand as harm—think Andy Warhol’s Soup Cans.310 
Third, design patents are still relatively new animals in terms of judicial 
experience. As commentators have observed, exploitation of the design 
patent has been only recently explosive.311 The cell phone wars, exemplified 
by Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,312 are only now beginning to map 
this unfolding frontier in the courts.313 Unexplored contours mean 
unpredictable outcomes in litigation, especially when lay jurors are the 
deciders, so litigation is deterred. From the plaintiff’s perspective, the ready 
patentability of the mundane gives prospective litigants pause. Dubious 
patent claims exert market chilling effect, as over-claiming is incentivized 
and risk-averse defendants are deterred from challenging validity.314 
Looking to the defense, the Internet has only relatively recently opened 
up a global market for infringing commercial and artistic products through 
new channels of communication that expose infringers to discovery.315 
Global fair use in copyright is still an infant concept;316 design patents have 
far to go before norms emerge around questions as nuanced as the IP-free 
speech balance. Making matters worse, the absurd ease with which design 
patents can be attained317 looks more like the ease of obtaining copyright than 
 
 309.  See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz-Steele, U.S. Business Tort Liability for the Transnational Republisher 
of Leaked Corporate Secrets, 1 AMITY J. MEDIA & COMM. STUDS. 68, 71 (2011), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1947129 (explaining electronic-era “Streisand effect,” by which efforts to suppress 
information inadvertently spur prolific dissemination). Nevertheless, as we explain below, it is especially 
these potential defendants whose free speech is in jeopardy, whether facing a determined plaintiff or 
suffering a chilling effect. 
 310.  See Campbell Soup Cans, MOMA LEARNING, 
http://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/andy-warhol-campbells-soup-cans-1962 (last visited Sept. 
10, 2015). 
 311.  E.g., Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights, University of 
Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-17, at 12 (draft, Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656590 (charting design patent grants from 1840 to 2010, showing upward 
spike from 1990 to 2010), cited in Burstein, Design Patent Myths—An Introduction, supra note 7. 
 312.  678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 313.  For a helpful summary of infringement lessons from Apple v. Samsung, see Christopher Carani, 
Design Patent Lessons from Apple v. Samsung, MANAGING IP, Sept. 2012, at 35. 
 314.  E.g., Brean, supra note 240, at 377–78. 
 315.  For discussion of global industrial design protection under the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), see Frenkel, supra note 176, at 536–38. 
 316.  Peltz, supra note 181, at 286–88. 
 317.  See, e.g., Burstein, Design Patent Myths—It’s Really Difficult to Get a Design Patent, supra 
note 7 (citing recent patents for the garment hanger, cylindrical earplug, and bottle). To link to a delicious 
parody of this ease, see Rebecca J. Rosen, Apple Patents Letters (JK JK), ATLANTIC (Nov. 26, 2012, 1:11 
PM ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/11/apple-patents-letters-jk-jk/265590/. 
The parody followed up the very real. See Emily Price, Apple Patents the Virtual Page Turn, CNN (Nov. 
19, 2012, updated 2:53 PM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/16/tech/innovation/apple-page-turn-
patent/. 
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the infamous arduousness of utility patent prosecution.318 But design patents 
lack the inversely tempering derogation of copyright fair use. 
While there is no body of free expression doctrine in design patent law, 
the First Amendment also has not been excluded consciously. Its omission 
likely is an oversight, corollary to the non-deliberate location of design 
protection in the patent regime (or sui generis in the EU) rather than in 
copyright. Had historical tides rested design protection in copyright, where 
it started in 18th-century England, there would be little serious question 
today that fair use would pertain as a defense. Significantly, free expression 
seems immaterial to the usual case of utility-patent infringement, because 
the offense arises in the construction of a machine, manufacturer or 
composition of matter or in the execution of a process, all almost always 
involving non-expressive conduct.319 In stark comparison, the reiteration of 
a design is inherently expressive. Even when design patent infringement is 
accomplished most immediately through conduct, such as the sale or import 
of infringing goods, there is a First Amendment dimension to the problem, 
as when copyrights were allegedly infringed in the recent Supreme Court 
case concerning the re-sale and import of textbooks.320 The underlying 
content is expressive nonetheless, and the sale or import perpetuates the 
expression. 
There is nothing structural about design patents that makes them 
incompatible with fair use; to the contrary, the similarity between copyrights 
and design patents makes fair use a good fit. Public interest is paramount in 
either case, because both copyrights and design patents are rooted in the IP 
Clause. The defendant in a simple case of unfair commercial competition, 
such as the subsequent user of an ornamental design for toilet tissue, would 
readily flunk the fair use test, if the defendant could assert expressive interest 
at all. Cases of artistic merit—say an architect designing a museum of 
technology borrowed the patented glass staircase of an Apple store321—could 
 
 318.  See FY 2013 USPTO Workload Tables, Table 4: Patent Pendency Statistics, USPTO (2013), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2013PAR.pdf#page=191 (showing that 
it currently takes 29.1 months on average for a utility patent application to be processed). 
 319.  A clever law professor might construct a hypothetical that would pit the utility patent against 
free expression in its core sphere of influence. Cf., e.g., Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 164, at 34–35 
(observing limitation on offers of sale under utility patent, in relation to First Amendment commercial 
speech doctrine). Perhaps imagine, as a political statement about the impact of unregulated capitalism on 
climate change, a patented process that dramatically combusts the U.S. flag into a red, white, and blue 
chemical cloud that scrubs loose carbon from the air as it dissipates. We go only so far as to hypothesize 
that a First Amendment case against utility patent infringement might be articulated on the right 
extraordinary facts, regardless of whether the defense could survive intermediate scrutiny. 
 320.  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1357 (2013). 
 321.  U.S. Patent No. D478,999S (filed July 15, 2002). 
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be tested for purpose and character of use, nature of original, amount and 
substantiality of taking, and effect on the market for the original.322 In fact, 
the protected design might be copyrighted simultaneously and subject to fair 
use analysis just the same. The fair use analysis complements “total concept” 
and “total feel” approaches already known in copyrights and design patents. 
As in copyrights, commercial gain from the subsequent use would push the 
design patent analysis toward infringement, and transformation in 
subsequent iteration would push the analysis away from infringement. 
We are not the first commentators to observe the omission of a fair use 
defense from the analytical framework in patents or design patents. Brean in 
2008 called for design patents “to gracefully step down,” arguing 
persuasively that copyright and trademark law are up to the job of design 
protection.323 But recognizing the unlikelihood of design patent abolition, he 
posited a series of reforms, including the adoption of a fair use doctrine “to 
allow the public to use and build upon the works of others,” and “to benefit 
from better designs and more of them.”324 
O’Rourke in 2000 assertively articulated the need for a fair use defense 
in patents generally, modeled after copyrights, to combat economic-market 
failure in the protection-innovation balance.325 O’Rourke described 
copyright fair use itself—a sort of “limited royalty-free compulsory license,” 
in IP terms—as an effective mechanism to fine-tune economic efficiency in 
copyrights.326 She described three situations in which fair use draws the 
proper balance. First, as in the famous case approving home-television 
video-recording,327 fair use worked around the problem of high transaction 
costs for consumers who would otherwise need program-by-program 
permission to copy, while not compromising market incentives to create.328 
Second, fair use allows the positive externality of social commentary to 
outweigh protectionism when the commentary injects a valuable new 
intellectual product into the public marketplace without excessive taking 
 
 322.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (copyright fair use provision). 
 323.  Brean, supra note 240, at 381. 
 324.  Id. at 380 (citing Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United 
States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and 
Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 925–36, 976–77 (2004)). 
 325.  Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1177 (2000). We are indebted to Professor Ruth Okediji, University of Minnesota Law School, for 
pointing us to this article at the very start of our research process. 
 326.  Id. at 1188. 
 327.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984). 
 328.  O’Rourke, supra note 325, at 1188–89. 
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from the inspiring original.329 Third, fair use makes room for criticism or 
parody, products that bring value to the public marketplace of ideas, but 
which the original creator might be unwilling to license.330 
O’Rourke posited that the fast pace of innovation in the technological 
age is undermining the public interest in the IP balance.331 Though patents 
have adaptive mechanisms to correct the balance—namely, the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents, the doctrine of blocking patents, the experimental 
use exception, and the misuse doctrine—O’Rourke found these doctrines no 
longer up to the job.332 She reasoned that both patents and copyrights are 
construed according to “a mixture of statutory provisions and common law 
principles,”333 and that because the two bodies of law aim to balance the same 
economic priorities, courts have evolved and borrowed doctrine, one from 
the other, as needed to fine-tune the balance, such as in the development of 
respective “first sale” doctrines.334 Moreover, Congress has acted to fine-tune 
the balance in the public interest in narrow contexts, such as in allowance for 
infringement in the federal drug approval process.335 Accordingly, she 
proposed a multi-factor fair use test for patent law, adapted from 
copyrights.336 O’Rourke pressed her argument even while acknowledging 
that “patented inventions are simply not imbued with the same First 
Amendment interests that copyrighted materials tends to be.”337 But 
O’Rourke impliedly focused exclusively on utility patents. Her logic is 
amplified where design patents are concerned, because the historical 
interchangeability with copyrights is exaggerated, and free expression does 
tend to be implicated in infringement cases. 
In 2011, Strandburg revitalized the call for a fair use defense to patent 
infringement.338  Strandburg explained that while O’Rourke’s article was 
remarkably prescient, the growth of patent trolling and advances in complex 
technology have exaggerated the need for reform even more than one might 
have anticipated.339  Specifically, Strandburg described five developments in 
 
 329.  Id. at 1189. See e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 569 
(1985). 
 330.  O’Rourke, supra note 325, at 1189. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 592 (1994). 
 331.  O’Rourke, supra note 325, at 1177. 
 332.  Id. at 1192–96. 
 333.  Id. at 1196. 
 334.  Id. 
 335.  Id. at 1197 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)). 
 336.  Id. at 1230–34. 
 337.  Id. at 1198. 
 338.  Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265, 265 (2011). 
 339.  Id. at 281. 
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the patent system: (1) increased recognition that open sourcing facilitates 
innovation, especially by technology users; (2) diminished protection for 
consumers under patent exhaustion doctrine and in the repair-reconstruction 
dichotomy; (3) mounting inadequacy of the notice-and-search system, 
especially in software and business methods; (4) increased occurrence of 
independent invention (partly a function of the inadequate notice-and-search 
system); and (5) growing prevalence of product customization by users, in 
tandem with a growing divide between the manufacture and design of 
products.340  Ultimately Strandburg posited a fair use test tailored to redress 
shortcoming in the general patent system.  Her factors included (1) the 
justifiability of the alleged infringer’s failure to purchase a license, taking 
account of sub-factors including the social value of the allegedly infringing 
use; (2) whether the alleged infringer made “substantial improvements” and 
why blocking patent failed; (3) the ease of “alternative innovation” strategies 
relative to the incentive function of patent; and (4) whether the alleged 
infringer was “a knowing copyist, independent inventor, or something in 
between,” relative to the efficacy of the notice-and-search process.341  Like 
O’Rourke, Strandburg did not address design patent specifically, but her 
rationales serve just as well in design patent as in patent in general. 
Most recently, Asay has posited a comprehensive theory of 
“hybridization” for copyright and patent, emphasizing application in 
technology.342  He proposed breaking down the rigid dichotomy between the 
two and permitting interplay between their doctrines, injecting into patent 
analysis a regard for creative productivity, and injecting into copyright fair 
use concepts akin to obviousness and novelty.343  In development 
contemporaneously with this article, Asay’s work accords with our thesis in 
prioritizing creative productivity.  But his approach is fundamentally 
incompatible with ours. 
In formulating a model of hybridization, Asay recognized the 
implications for creative productivity specifically in design patent,344 and he 
considered the influence of the First Amendment on other proposals to blend 
or borrow between copyright and patent.345  Looking to the lack of fair use 
 
 340.  Id. at 291-89. 
 341.  Id. at 300-01.  Strandburg pointed for example to 3D printing, which epitomizes user 
customization and “blur[s] the distinction . . . between designing and producing tangible goods.”  Id. at 
288. 
 342.  Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, ___ U. COLO. L. REV. ___ 
(forthcoming), available on SSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576021 (draft Mar. 10, 2015). 
 343.  Id. at 4. 
 344.  Id. at 12. 
 345.  Id. at 19-20. 
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in patent as an example, Asay asserted that allowing dichotomous areas of 
IP protection to overlap creates the very problem of needing to pick and 
choose doctrine, while hybridization derives IP law at the start from a 
coherent body of values.346  Asay furthermore doubted whether “the First 
Amendment [is] sufficient to jettison the dichotomy” between copyright and 
patent.347  Seeing a host of scholarly theories littering the courts’ cutting-
room floors, Asay concluded that a more fundamental reimagining of the 
relationship between copyright and patent is required to overcome judicial 
fealty to a misperceived constitutional foundation for dichotomy.348 
We acknowledge Asay’s efforts to create a model for hybridization, but 
we maintain that the Constitution compels a copyright-patent dichotomy.349  
Anyway, we are skeptical that a wholesale reimagining will fare better than 
a modest proposal for borrowed doctrine, especially considering the 
commitment of the legal profession to existing silos of IP practice.  Thus in 
a narrower vein, this article examines constitutional imperatives specially in 
design patent, arising from its peculiarly creative character.  Asay’s 
commentary on the inseparability of creativity and invention350 serves 
equally well in support of our fair use thesis.  Accordingly, part II of this 
article exposed the fundamental constitutional defect in design patent.  But 
failing the courts’ wholesale rejection of design patent, this part III means at 
minimum to shore up counsel to argue, and to “embolden[]”351 courts to 
recognize, the essentiality of fair use. 
In the following part, we hypothesize a case of design patent 
infringement and demonstrate the essentiality, appropriateness, and 
application of the fair use test. 
D.  Design Patents and the Peace Pretzel 
A federal case in 2013, closed upon voluntary dismissal without a court 
opinion,352 nicely demonstrates the need for a fair use defense in design 
patent law. Until the expiration of its 14-year term in April 2014, patent 
D423,184 protected this “pretzel,” which we call the Peace Pretzel:353 
 
 346.  See id. at 12-13. 
 347.  Id. at 20. 
 348.  Id. at 32-33. 
 349.  Supra part II.A. 
 350.  See Asay, supra note 342 at 23-28. 
 351.  Id. at 33. 
 352.  Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Friend v. Keystone Pretzels, No. 2:13-cv-01028 (W.D. Pa. filed 
Nov. 18, 2013). 
 353.  U.S. Patent No. D423,184 (filed Apr. 15, 1999). 
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Plaintiff Leslie Friend of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, purchased the 
design patent in the last year of its validity from the sister of the inventor, 
Michael Lamont, who had passed away in 2007. Friend’s attorneys told 
media that Friend planned to start a pretzel business.354 She then discovered 
the design on offer from an online Massachusetts pretzel purveyor called 
Laurel Hill Foods. Laurel Hill sold pretzel chips in the shape of a peace sign 
in three flavors—”everything,” sea salt, and honey multigrain355—which 
Laurel Hill bought from a Pennsylvania company, Keystone Pretzels. Friend 
 
 354.  Rich Lord, Patent of Pretzels Shaped Like Peace Signs at Center of Pittsburgh Federal Lawsuit, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, (July 17, 2013, 7:30 PM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/business/legal/2013/07/17/Patent-of-pretzels-shaped-like-peace-signs-at-center-of-
Pittsburgh-federal-lawsuit/stories/201307170201. The inventor was Michael Lamont, founder and owner 
of a popular art-house cinema, The Bijou Theatre, in Eugene, Oregon, from 1980 until his death in 2007. 
U.S. Patent No. D423,184 (filed Apr. 15, 1999); Theater of the Week: Bijou Art Cinemas, AMIA FILM 
ADVOCACY TASK FORCE (May 15, 2013), http://www.filmadvocacy.org/2013/05/15/theater-of-the-
week-bijou-art-cinemas/; T. Davis, Leaving His (Land)Mark, DAILY EMERALD ARCHIVES (Jan. 7, 2008, 
12:00 AM), http://dailyemerald.com/2008/01/07/leaving-his-landmark/. Friend bought the patent from 
Lamont’s sister. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Patent Reassignment 25039-507 
(2010), available at, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&pat=D423184; P.G. Rant, The 
Rant: Research Paper on The Bijou Theatre in Eugene, OR, ITEMS OF VARIOUS IMPORTANCE (Jan. 25, 
2011, 8:37 PM) http://itemsofvariousimportance.blogspot.com/2011/01/research-paper-on-bijou-theatre-
in.html. We could find no accounting of why Lamont applied for the Peace Pretzel patent in 1999, nor 
whether he ever made them. A biographer noted that Lamont was “a hardcore Republican” who 
“supported Bush Senior’s Gulf War decision.” Id. 
 355.  Hungry yet? See Laurel Hill, Pretzel Chips, http://laurelhillfoods.com/pretzel-chips/ (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
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sued Laurel Hill and Keystone, seeking royalties or profits, damages, 
attorney’s fees, and an injunction.356 
A symbol such as the peace sign can qualify for copyright insofar as the 
symbol constitutes a “pictorial, graphic, [or] sculptural work[].”357 For 
example, the court recognized the copyrightability of a stylized letter omega 
in a globe, a graphic work of no more complexity than the peace sign, in the 
2008 Ninth Circuit case, Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.358 Even 
though the peace sign has long existed, a particular representation of it could 
still be copyrighted. For instance, Peace Frogs, Inc., claims copyrights in 
“various designs and derivative works of combinations of frogs and peace 
word, signs and symbols.”359 Similarly, one could imagine a company selling 
Peace Pretzel T-shirts bearing copyrighted images.360 Of course, the scope of 
copyright in such cases only reaches the expression not the idea,361 so the 
copyright would afford no monopoly over the concept of twisting an actual, 
edible pretzel into a peace-sign shape. 
But a design patent would ride to the rescue in the pretzel case. The 
“inventor” of the Peace Pretzel did not have to worry about the idea-
expression dichotomy in copyright law; instead, after an apparently easy 
process to claim a design patent in the Peace Pretzel with little or no scrutiny 
for qualifying novelty, an enforceable monopoly for 14 years was created.362 
The design patent affords the Peace Pretzel the best of both worlds. 
Inventor Lamont’s prosecution of the design patent required more than a 
copyright registration, but not much more; the drawings were technical, but 
 
 356.  Complaint at ¶¶ A–E, Friend v. Keystone Pretzels, No. 2:2013-cv-01028-DSC (W.D. Pa. filed 
July 17, 2013) (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–85 as to damages and fees). 
 357.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012). Conscientious objector Gerald Holtom conceived of the peace 
sign in 1958, drawing on the semaphore signs for the N in nuclear and the D in disarmament. KEN 
KOLSBUN WITH MICHAEL S. SWEENEY, PEACE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A SYMBOL 33-35 (2008); Kathryn 
Westcott, World’s Best-known Protest Symbol Turns 50, BBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7292252.stm.  By doing so, he created a work of visual art 
that would qualify for copyright protection under current law. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(5) & 101, para. 
33 (2012). 
 358.  Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 562 U.S. 40 (2010), abrogated on different grounds by Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 359.  Complaint at ¶¶ 6, 25–30, Peace Frogs, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., No. 4:14 cv 22, 2014 WL 938739, 
at *1, 3 (E.D. Va. filed Feb. 26, 2014). See, e.g., PEACE FROGS, Adult Celtic Truth Organic Short Sleeve 
T-Shirt, http://www.peacefrogs.com/product/1391/22 (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 360.  Cf. AUNTIE ANNE’S PRETZEL PERFECT, Registration No. 3,327,212 (showing a pretzel 
trademark registration—the source of our hypothetical t-shirts). The pretzel has been a symbol since it 
was adopted by the baker’s guild in 12th-century Europe. E.g., NADIA HASSANI, SPOONFULS OF 
GERMANY: CULINARY DELIGHTS OF THE GERMAN REGIONS IN 170 RECIPES 220 (2004). 
 361.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
 362.  See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012). 
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straightforward. Lamont never had to bake or sell a Peace Pretzel, only to 
think of it. USPTO scrutiny for novelty was negligible, forestalling any 
validity challenge until a dispute might arise. The Peace Pretzel was then 
reserved from the marketplace of ideas for 14 years. Lamont and the 
subsequent owners of the patent, his sister and purchaser Friend, were 
entitled to exclude others from the design. The patent protection was not 
limited to combating commercial confusion, nor to the contents of particular 
artistic expressions; rather, more broadly, the patent precluded the making, 
using, or selling of a pretzel in the shape of peace sign.363 
Commentators on the Friend lawsuit suggested that Laurel Hill pretzel 
chips were not deep enough, in dimension, to run afoul of the Peace Pretzel 
design patent, in which figure 2 suggests a depth of dough equivalent to the 
width depicted in figure 1.364 We disagree. Employing design patent 
infringement analysis, the minimal novelty requirement would be satisfied 
by the peace-sign shape of the pretzel dough, which is what differentiates the 
product from the traditional pretzel knot.365 That very novelty is the defining 
characteristic of Laurel Hill pretzel chips. The ordinary observer very well 
might purchase the one, supposing it to be the other.366 So Friend had a strong 
lawsuit on her hands, even while she never got her pretzel business off the 
ground, and the impetus for Lamont’s initial conception in 1999 was all but 
forgotten. Neither news reports nor the case record explain why Friend 
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice just four months after filing, but it is 
reasonable to speculate that a settlement was reached. 
E.  Design Fair Use, Pretzels for Peace, and Oily-Pelican Art 
The Peace Pretzel problem can be used to demonstrate the essentiality, 
appropriateness, and potential application of a fair use test in design patent. 
We will examine its implications, varying some of the facts, and introduce 
another hypothetical case that articulates the problem with even greater 
urgency. 
Friend’s case to profit from the Peace Pretzel design is arguable as a 
matter of good public policy. On the one hand, she might be characterized as 
a patent troll or at least someone seeking to exploit the ridiculous ease with 
 
 363.  See id. § 154(a)(1). 
 364.  E.g., Design Patents and the Pretzel Patent Troll, IP NAV, http://www.ipnav.com/blog/design-
patents-and-the-pretzel-patent-troll/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 365.  See Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) (discussing 
the need and effect of comparing the patent claims against the prior art); AUNTIE ANNE’S PRETZEL 
PERFECT, Registration No. 3,327,212. 
 366.  Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871). See supra Section II.A.4. 
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which one can obtain a design patent on the mundane. On the other hand, 
Friend was the rightful purchaser and owner of Lamont’s patent and might 
well have been on the verge of starting a unique business. The pretzel in its 
traditional knot has been around more than 1,000 years, and as far as we 
know, no one until Lamont in 1999 thought to combine it with a symbol for 
disarmament advocacy.367 That is progress of some kind within the meaning 
of the IP clause. Win or lose, Friend’s time-limited monopoly came to an 
end in 2014, remitting the asset of the Peace Pretzel to the public mind, 
potentially giving us something that we did not have previously. 
The missing piece in the Friend lawsuit, and the unresolved problem 
presented by design patents, is fair use. In contrast with copyrights, design 
patents lack the structural safeguard of the idea-expression dichotomy and 
are not limited in scope to fixed expressions. Most importantly, design 
patents, at least as presently understood, lack copyrights’ constitutionally 
critical accommodation of the First Amendment: the fair use doctrine. At 
minimum, the generic intermediate scrutiny of the First Amendment, for 
content-neutral government regulations that incidentally affect speech, must 
come into play when the violation of a design patent is expressive in nature. 
Insofar as Friend was a sympathetic plaintiff, Laurel Hill and Keystone 
were profiting off the ingenuity of another and may have been expected fairly 
to pay up. But change the defendant to a non-commercial user, and the case 
takes on a different cast. Imagine a city rally for Ukrainian-Russian peace at 
which a sponsoring ethnic bakery makes and gives away peace-sign-shaped 
pretzels.368 Or suppose that a German-American citizens group decides to 
counter community angst over immigration by uniting local persons of 
different backgrounds in Oktoberfest beer gardens to dialog over homemade 
peace-sign-shaped pretzels.369 Peace-sign-shaped cookies, adorned or not 
 
 367.  Pretzel origins might actually fall closer to pacifism than to the Oktoberfest beer garden, as one 
theory posits that the traditional pretzel knot represented the folded arms of the pious monastic baker. 
E.g., Brezel (Laugenbrezel), BADISCHE KÜCHEN-KUNDE, http://www.bad-
bad.de/restaur/kuechenkunde/brezel.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 368.  Cf. Consumer and Market Insights: Savory Snacks Market in Ukraine, REPORT BUYER, 
https://www.reportbuyer.com/product/2796575/consumer-and-market-insights-savory-snacks-market-
in-ukraine.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (listing monthly report of Canadean Ltd. On market in 
Ukraine for savory snacks, including pretzels; analyzing market responses to political instability). 
 369.  Laurel Hill’s pretzel chips were featured on the website of the PeaceMeal Project, 
http://peacemealproject.com/2012/05/11/pretzels-for-peace/, which seeks “to explore the connections 
between peace and food.” PEACEMEAL PROJECT, http://peacemealproject.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 
10, 2015). 
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with sugar crystals,370 or other edibles,371 also might run afoul of the design 
patent, as the controlling diagrams say nothing about the edible ingredients. 
Farther afield, suppose shaped pretzels become objets d’art. A latter-
day Andy Warhol372 or redirected Thomas Forsyth373 might create a range of 
artwork meant to comment on the inequality of food distribution around the 
world, even employing bread dough as ironic medium.374 The Peace Pretzel 
might be just one entry in a series of works, perhaps alongside a doughy stalk 
of wheat,375 a floury planet earth,376 and a bready bas-relief of scythe-
wielding farm workers.377 
We can complicate the case further if we trade out the peace sign for a 
more controversial symbol. To choose a plaintiff that engenders less 
sympathy, suppose that the multinational oil and gas company BP378 obtained 
a design patent on a distinctive container for motor oil—let us borrow the 
double-sphere bottle in which POM Wonderful sells fruit juice.379 After the 
BP oil spill, a protestor and artist creates a sculpture depicting a blackened, 
oil-sodden pelican,380 surrounded by upturned BP oil bottles, also blackened, 
 
 370.  See, e.g., Lora Wiley, Tie-Dyed Peace Sugar Cookies, DIARY OF A MAD HAUSFRAU, (May 27, 
2010, 11:18 AM), http://www.diaryofamadhausfrau.com/2010/05/tie-dyed-peace-sugar-cookies-
for.html. 
 371.  See, e.g., Peace Sign Molded Sugar Decorations for Cakes, Cookies, and Cupcakes 24 Count, 
ZIBBET, http://www.zibbet.com/Bakingsuppliesgalore/artwork?artworkId=283067 (last visited Sept. 10, 
2015). See also Annie’s Homegrown Organic Peace Pasta with Parmesan, AMAZON, 
http://www.amazon.com/Annies-Homegrown-Organic-Parmesan-6-Ounce/dp/B000CQ6LJQ (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 372.  See THE WARHOL, http://www.warhol.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (describing Warhol’s 
life and art). 
 373.  See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing 
artist who positioned nude Barbie dolls “in various absurd and often sexualized positions”). 
 374.  See You Art What You Eat, MASSMOCA, 
http://www.massmoca.org/event_details.php?id=508 (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (describing an art 
exhibit of works made out of or commenting on food). 
 375.  See, e.g., Artisan Bread in Five, How to Form the Pain d’Epi (Wheat Stalk Bread), BREADIN5, 
http://www.artisanbreadinfive.com/2008/02/22/how-to-form-the-pan-depi-wheat-stalk-bread (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 376.  See, e.g., Edible Books Contest: Atlas Shrugged, MY SECRET LIFE IN THE KITCHEN, 
http://mysecretlifeinthekitchen.wordpress.com/2013/04/25/edible-books-contest-atlas-shrugged/  (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 377.  Cf. Peter Singer, A Statue for Stalin?, PRAGUE POST, 
http://www.praguepost.com/viewpoint/34357-a-statue-for-stalin (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 378.  We will here vilify BP, because our story requires a villain. We are not, however, trying to 
make a political statement or take sides on the Gulf Coast tragedy. But see  Clifford Krauss & Campbell 
Robertson, BP Negligent in 2010 Oil Spill, U.S. Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/business/bp-negligent-in-2010-oil-spill-us-judge-rules.html?_r=0 
(reporting that a district court judge had found BP “grossly negligent” in the 2010 Gulf Coast oil spill). 
 379.  See U.S. Patent No. D510,525S (filed Dec. 2, 2004); U.S. Patent No. D476,899S (filed Mar. 
13, 2002). 
 380.  Cf. Don Gialanella, Oil Spill Duck Sculpture, LIVESTEEL, 
http://livesteel.deviantart.com/art/Oil-Spill-Duck-Sculpture-172960767, (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) 
CLIFFORD & PELTZ-STEELE - DESIGN PATENTS FINAL - WEBSITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/15  12:54 PM 
608 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 14:2 
but recognizable by their shape. The artist might re-create (make) the bottles, 
or use discarded bottles. The artist might auction off (sell) the sculpture and 













Critical training is hardly required to perceive the artist’s message 
favoring environmental protection, or inversely, blaming BP for 
environmental degradation. But the work plainly runs afoul of the design 
patents, as the artist has made or used, and sold, the patented bottles. Novelty 
is not in question; indeed, the artist was counting on the novelty of the bottle 
design to make her point clear. The ordinary observer properly perceives the 
BP bottles; indeed, the artist might be using BP bottles, which our auction 
winner buys because they are what they appear to be. In remedy, BP may 
stand little to gain in profit disgorgement, but our artist will be liable for 
damages at least at the royalty rate381 and no less than $250.00.382 Further, 
the artist might be enjoined from creating more sculptures along the same, 
bottle-laden theme.383 Most significantly, the artist would face the high cost 
of patent defense in attorney’s fees and other costs and might even be called 
upon to pay BP’s fees.384 
Neither our protest-pretzel organizers nor our oily-pelican artist would 
be liable for copyright infringement. Assuming arguendo that the Peace 
 
(picturing work of artist who “scoops up blobs of oil” from the Louisiana shoreline to provide his 
medium). 
 381.  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 382.  See id. § 289. 
 383.  See id. § 283. 
 384.  See id. § 285. 
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Pretzel385 and the hypothetical BP oil bottle386 would be eligible for 
copyright, the fair use doctrine would almost certainly preclude liability.387 
The political-advocacy, not-for-profit purpose of the defendants tilts the first 
factor of fair use analysis heavily in their favor.388 The second factor, nature 
of the copyrighted work,389 arguably disfavors the plaintiffs on the pretzel 
analysis, because very little originality supplements the public-domain 
symbol. Like in Campbell, the nature factor in the oily-pelican case is “not 
much help” when the taking is literal and deliberate for the purpose of 
straight or parodic commentary.390 On the third factor, amount and 
substantiality is total on the pretzel case, so arguably favors the plaintiff, but 
the very slight originality again mitigates the importance of the factor.391 In 
the oil can case, the amount and substantiality also are total, but the bottle 
shape is essential to accomplish the critical purpose.392 Anything short of the 
double-bulb design would not “conjure up” the original in the mind of the 
viewer; an oil-laden pelican sends a message of environmental protection 
against resource exploitation in general, but does not plainly indict BP as a 
blameworthy actor. Finally, on the important fourth factor of market 
appropriation, the pretzel events are not impinging on a market in the 
 
 385.  Inventor Lamont’s patent application might suffice; to qualify for copyright, the Peace Pretzel 
would have to be fixed in a tangible medium of expression. An image may be infringed by a three-
dimensional representation, as a cartoon character embodied in a doll, just as a portrait may infringe 
copyright in a three-dimensional character portrayed by a person. But it is not clear whether the patent 
diagram sufficiently resembles the real thing for copyright purposes, even assuming it introduces enough 
originality to differentiate it from the public-domain peace sign. The copyrightability of patent diagrams 
is an interesting tangent, though fair use usually obviates the problem by robustly protecting the 
reproduction of public records. See, e.g., Rich Stim, Copyright for Patent Drawings?, DEAR RICH: 
NOLO’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG (Apr. 10, 2015, 9:37 AM), 
http://dearrichblog.blogspot.com/2009/03/copyright-for-patent-drawings.html (citing Rozenblat v. 
Sandia Corp., 79 Fed. App’x. 904 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing copyright but finding no infringement for 
want of substantial similarity)). 
 386.  See Lisa Pearson, Andrew Pequignot, & Ashford Tucker, U.S. Copyright Protection for Logos, 
Packaging and Products, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAGAZINE, Oct. 2010, at 37, 38–40. For 
infringement analysis, the double-bulb feature is here assumed to be an ornamental feature conceptually 
separable from the bottle’s function as an oil container. 
 387.  The pretzel defendants may defend also with the doctrine of independent creation if they were 
unaware of the predecessor expression of a Peace Pretzel. 
 388.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 
539, 561–63 (1985); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding 
publication of images taken from a copyrighted film of the John F. Kennedy assignation was fair use 
because of its political importance). 
 389.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 563–64 (discussing 
the effect of a copyright in a factual work on fair use analysis). 
 390.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
 391.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012). 
 392.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588–89 (recognizing that the parodist must copy a significant portion of 
the original for the parody to be successful). 
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absence of a developed product.393 One can force the copyright question by 
hypothesizing additional facts: the propagation of a successful Peace Pretzel 
business with product sales knowingly bypassed by giveaways. The case 
then fairly becomes a closer question, analogous to the satiric portrayal of a 
politician as a Disney villain.394 In the oil-bottle case, like in Campbell, the 
auction buyer does not buy the sculpture as a substitute for BP oil bottles. 
Design patents, on the other hand, bear an obvious flaw. Without the 
structural safeguards and fair use defense that shape copyrights to 
accommodate free speech, design patents exclude the activists and artists 
from political advocacy and social commentary. These functions lie at the 
heart of First Amendment protection, and for good reason. If design patents 
can be perverted to freeze out this speech, then the public policy goals of free 
speech395 are not achieved. Human dignity is compromised by restraint on 
free expression. The marketplace of ideas is hobbled in the attainment of 
truth. With opinion bottled up, self-governance is impaired, and the 
expressive safety valve is constricted, putting the society at risk of unhealthy 
volatility. Rather than perpetuating progress, the IP Clause through 
unconstrained design patents undermines the IP-free speech balance, 
flouting the public interest. 
The First Amendment might be employed as a backstop, but the 
fumbling second prong of intermediate scrutiny invites the subjectivity and 
unpredictability of balancing, less than ideal to protect core political 
speech.396 Intermediate scrutiny is inapt anyway when design patents reach 
beyond the scope of commercial speech and content-neutral regulation. No 
lesser scrutiny can suffice, because design patents, like copyrights, 
inherently reserve expression from the marketplace of ideas, and because 
design patents, unlike trademarks and consumer protection law, do not aim 
to combat falsity in the commercial marketplace.397 At the same time, the 
 
 393.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 566–68 (“‘Fair use, when 
properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of 
the work which is copied.’” (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1.10[D], at 1–87  (1984)). 
 394.  See Alan White, 13 Global Politicians as Disney Villains, BUZZFEED (Apr. 10, 2015, 2:59 
AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/alanwhite/13-world-politicians-imagined-as-disney-villains. 
 395.  See supra note 175. 
 396.  See, e.g., U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 213–14 (1997). 
 397.  Compare Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (noting that trademark protection addresses consumer deception) with Krueger Intern., Inc. v. 
Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The purpose of patent law is to encourage 
innovation by excluding competition (i.e., copying) for a limited period of time.”), overruled on other 
grounds by, Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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legitimate demands of legal protection under the IP Clause make strict 
scrutiny an excessively burdensome response. 
It is unnecessary to craft a new strict scrutiny test under the First 
Amendment because the copyright fair use doctrine provides a well-drawn 
test designed already to accommodate the balance between the IP Clause and 
the First Amendment. The deep similarity of copyrights and design patents, 
notwithstanding their semantic differences and historical divergence, further 
suggest the appropriateness of fair use to design patents with only slight 
adaptations that can be done as a matter of constitutional law, without 
modification to statutory patent law. The Supreme Court recognized that fair 
use in common law manifests a First Amendment imperative.398 Patry 
emphasized that as a common law construct, even the “codification” of fair 
use doctrine should not be taken to stunt its exploration and development in 
the courts.399 
The first factor of fair use, as derived from copyright, examines “the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”400 This factor 
imports cleanly into design patents. Where copyrights in sculptural works 
look to the purpose and character of infringing reproduction, derivation, 
distribution, or public display,401 the emphasis in patents must be on the 
purpose and character of making, using, offering, or selling.402 The latter 
emphasis only sharpens the usually salient focus on commercialism. This 
factor cuts against Laurel Hills and Keystone Pretzels, but in favor of peace 
activists and artists. Though like in Campbell, the fact that an artist seeks to 
profit from his or her work does not necessarily convert the purpose and 
character of the use from noncommercial to commercial.403 With the 
emphasis of patents on the exchange of invention for limited commercial 
monopoly, the controlling distinction arises between the character of use as 
an ornamental feature incidental to a utilitarian commercial product, and the 
character of use as an aesthetic feature of an artwork regardless of whether 
it is offered or sold in commerce. 
 
 398.  See Golan v. Holder,132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2013) (“[T]he idea/expression dichotomy and the fair 
use defense . . . are recognized in our jurisprudence as built-in First Amendment accommodations.” 
(quotation marks and citations omitted)); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003). 
 399.  4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 158, § 10:8 (distinguishing “codification” from “statutory 
recognition”). 
 400.  17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
 401.  See id. § 106. 
 402.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 403.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). 
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The second factor of fair use considers the nature of the protected 
work.404 In copyrights, nature reflects the investment of creativity (or 
originality) in the original work; the closer to mere sweat of the brow, the 
less creativity, the less protection. Fiction is preferred to nonfiction.405 An 
annotated bibliography is entitled to less protection than an original novel; a 
news photograph of a public gathering is less protected than an abstract oil 
painting of an imaginary landscape.406 Design patents’ counterpart to 
creativity is novelty,407 and the nature factor adapts well to consider the 
novelty of the protected work. Design patent infringement already demands 
focus on the novel ornamental features that distinguish the patented design 
from prior art.408 The greater the novelty of the design, the greater is its scope 
of protection vis-à-vis a competing use.409 The novelty of a pretzel in the 
shape of a peace sign introduces very little in addition to the prior art of 
shaped pretzels and peace signs apart, indicating that the scope of fair use 
will be broad. In contrast, if we pretend that BP rather than POM Wonderful 
was the exclusive adopter of the double-bulb bottle, the distinctiveness of the 
bottle, and accordingly its immediate recognition even in silhouette, favors 
the plaintiff. Though as the Court observed in Campbell, this factor bears 
less influence in cases of parody or “critical wit,” because recognition is the 
very (permissible) point of the latter use.410 
The third factor of fair use considers the amount and substantiality of 
the taken portion relative to the protected whole.411 This quantum scale also 
lends itself to easy adoption in the context of design patents. Construction of 
the “whole” in design patents must be confined to the novel whole, like the 
original whole in copyrights, not the whole of the product of which the novel 
design is a feature.412 In the pretzel cases, focusing on the novel “whole” of 
the pretzel-peace-sign union, the taking is thorough, tilting this factor to 
 
 404.  17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012). 
 405.  See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
 406.  See id. at 350 (“This Court has long recognized that the fact/expression dichotomy limits 
severely the scope of protection in fact-based works.”). 
 407.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–02 (2012). 
 408.  See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871); In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 
1214, 1215 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 409.  Cf. Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) (“In 
administering the patent law, the court first looks into the art, to find what the real merit of the alleged 
discovery or invention is, and whether it has advanced the art substantially. If it has done so, then the 
court is liberal in its construction of the patent. If what he has done works only a slight step forward . . . 
then his patent, if sustained, will be given a narrow scope . . . .”) (utility patent). 
 410.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994). 
 411.  17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012). 
 412.  See Application of Flett, 166 F.2d 822, 823–25 (C.C.P.A. 1948) (determining the “point of 
departure” to evaluate whether a new invention was claimed). 
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favor the plaintiff. Like in Campbell, when the satirist’s or imitator’s very 
objective is to remind the audience of the original, the defendant should be 
afforded latitude to “conjure up.”413 The oily-pelican artist might have no 
choice short of the whole bottle to ensure communication of her message. 
The fourth and critical factor considers “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the [protected] work.”414 This factor too 
nicely complements infringement analysis in design patents, which already 
considers whether the design’s use might cause the ordinary observer to 
mistake the imitator for the original.415 Thus in sync again with the 
commercial-monopoly function of patents and the lessened First 
Amendment urgency in commercial transactions, the patented design will 
enjoy greater protection when the allegedly infringing activity is closer to 
commercial competition, and less protection when the allegedly infringing 
activity is closer to noncommercial political or artistic expression. The 
Laurel Hill pretzel chips might well detract from the market value of Friend’s 
potential business, and certainly would detract from a developed business, 
tilting this factor in the plaintiff’s favor. Probably complimentary and 
symbolic Pretzels for Peace do not impinge on the market for commercial 
Peace Pretzels, favoring the defendants in those cases. Occasional Pretzels 
for Peace might even enhance the market for a regularly available 
commercial good. But that could change if home-making Pretzels for Peace 
becomes a widespread movement, or an advocacy organization begins 
production on a commercial scale. In the case of the oily-pelican artist, the 
competing use is no market substitute at all for the original. It is important 
in design patent analysis to recognize that the fourth factor focuses on the 
market for the whole product that the design adorns—not a market for the 
design itself—as the design is a means to a commercial end. The artist’s sales 
of blackened bottles-turned-sculpture might dampen enthusiasm for BP 
products because viewers agree with the artist’s political statement, like they 
might heed the cautions of a gripe site.416 But the sales of sculpture do not 
function as a market substitute for bottled motor oil, just as purchasers do 
not buy 2 Live Crew rap instead of Roy Orbison rockabilly.417 
In sum, the First Amendment and sound public policy require an 
affirmative defense to design patent infringement to maintain the IP Clause 
 
 413.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
 414.  17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). 
 415.  See Gorham Mfg., 81 U.S. at 528. 
 416.  See, e.g., Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. v. Houeix, 369 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 
2004). 
 417.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92. 
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in balance with the freedom of expression. The striking doctrinal similarity 
between design patents and copyrights powerfully suggests that the fair use 
doctrine draws an appropriate balance. Copyright’s flexible fair use test is 
readily adapted to the design patent context, requiring examination of (1) the 
purpose and character of the allegedly infringing making, using, offer, or 
sale, including its commercial purpose, or its educational, political, artistic, 
or other noncommercial purpose; (2) the nature of the patented design, 
focusing on its points of novel ornamentation; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion of design used in relation to the patented design 
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the allegedly infringing making, use, offer, 
or sale upon the potential market for or value of the product or products that 
bear the patented design. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Design patents represent an exercise of Congress’s power that is not 
given in Article I. While Congress has the unchallengeable authority to grant 
a patent to an inventor who advances the useful arts, no such power is given 
for Congress to grant patents to artistic designs. 
Even if Article I is interpreted broadly enough for Congress to create 
design patents, this must be done within the context of the limitations placed 
on congressional power by the First Amendment Speech Clause. The Patent 
Act fails to do this. This constitutional infirmity can be repaired using the 
same approach that was used to fit the Copyright Act within the 
constitutional framework—the judicial adoption of a fair use defense 
modeled on the one the courts created for copyright law. 
 
